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(IDIS),**

**COUNTERING TERRORISM IN THE HORN OF AFRICA:  
A CASE STUDY OF KENYA**

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STUDIES**

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## **DECLARATION**

I, the undersigned, declare that this project is my original work and that it has not been presented in any other institution for academic credit.

Peter V.G. Gatuiku

Sign: ..... Date: .....

This Research Project has been submitted for examination with my approved as the supervisor.

Prof Amb. Maria Nzomo

Sign: ..... Date: .....

## **DEDICATION**

This research project is dedicated to the love and friendship of my wife, Margaret

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

My gratitude goes to my wife and children for the support through the rigorous research period, to my classmates at the institute of diplomacy for their support and encouragement all the lecturers at the institute for their dedication in molding diplomats. Finally and the most important I would like to express my sincere gratitude's to my supervisor Prof Ambassador Maria Nzomo. For her patience, motivation intense and intense knowledge, I would never have been able to finish this thesis without her insightful knowledge.

## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

ACOTA	Africa Contingency Operations Assistance and Training
ACSRT	African Centre for Study and Research of Terrorism
AECA	Arms Export Control Act
AFRICOM	US Africa Command
AMISOM	African Union ‘Peacekeepers’ sent to Somalia
ARPCT	Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism
ATPU	Kenyan Anti-Terrorism Police Unit
AU	African Union
AU-PSC	AU Peace and Security Council
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
CJTF- HOA	Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
CT	Counter Terrorism
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
DOJ	African Union Department of Justice
DoS	United States Department of State
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC	East African Community
EACTI	East African Counter-Terrorism Initiative
EARSI	East African Regional Strategic Initiative
EU	European Union
EU-PSC	EU Political and Security Committee
EUTM Somalia	EU Training Mission – Somalia
FAA	Foreign Assistance Act
GCTF	Global Counterterrorism Forum
GoK	Government of Kenya
GWoT	Global War on Terror
HOA	Horn of Africa
ICPAT	Capacity Building Program Against Terrorism
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development

ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
KDF	Kenyan Defence Forces
KECOSCE	Kenya Community Support Center
MHR	Muslim for Human Rights
NCTC	National Counter Terrorism Center
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSA	Non-state Actors
NSAC	National Security Advisory Committee
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PA& E	Pacific Architects and Engineering
PREACT	Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism
SGI	Security Governance Initiative
SUPKEM	Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims
TPB	Terrorism Prevention Branch
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
UN	United Nations
UNGA	UN General Assembly
UNGC-T Strategy	UN Global CT Strategy
UNODC	UN Office on Drugs and Crime
UoN	University of Nairobi
US	United States
USAID	United States AID
USD	United States Dollars
USDOJ	United States Department of Justice
VE	Violent Extremism

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## **ABSTRACT**

This explores counterterrorism approaches in the Horn of Africa using Kenya as case study. The study investigates the performance of existing counterterrorism strategies and proposes a more comprehensive approach that includes all stakeholders, in the Horn of Africa and Kenya. This study uses Constructivism theory of International Relations as a tool to explain international terrorism and the best strategy to counter terror. The study accepts the hypotheses that: the State centric counterterrorism measure in the horn of Africa excludes non-state actors and has failed to combat terrorism; Increased acts of terror have been consequences of the Kenyan Government institutions focusing only on militaristic strategies, ignoring non-militaristic ones; and combined effort by both the state and Non-state actors ensures success in the fight against terror.

The data findings indicates that the counterterrorism strategy in Kenya have still not addressed preventive terrorism measures such as enhanced partnerships between government of Kenya and domestic NSAs to counter extremism and radicalization, as well as other root causes of terrorism; the strategy lacks an effective combating of terrorism, limited effort of continued diplomatic solutions to restore stability in adjoining countries, and less progressive cooperation with external actors The analysis points out that: State centric counterterrorism measures in the Horn of Africa is counter-productive;the government of Kenya focuses on militaristic strategies in the fight against terrorism; and the government's militaristic approach in counterterrorism has not been effective. Furthermore, the militaristic and State centric approach in counterterrorism such as crack down, illegal detention, and extra-judicial killings of terror suspects and innocent victims has fueled terrorism. Also the inclusion of Non-State Actors, just governance, equality and other soft-power measures reduces terrorism.

The study recommends a national counterterrorism and counter violent extremism plans that involves State and non-State actors; other effective counterterrorism strategy that includes elements of border managements, diplomatic arrangements, addressing marginalization of Muslims and equipping the security forces; and finally a grand strategy to countering terrorism in Kenya. Such multilateral grand strategy involves strengthening regional and international actors in the unstable Somalia,fight against corruption as a loophole of counterterror, supersession of regional interest in peace and security over national interest of coalitions in Somalia, prioritization of regional information sharing and coordination of intelligence,regional support to the economic development of Somalia to address some elements of terror root causes and robust border control and screening of criminals from refugees. .

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

#### 1.1 Background to the Study

In late 2004 report from the office of the United Nations Secretary General, terrorism is an act projected to cause death or grave body-harm on civilians or non-combatants with the determination of intimidating a population or coercing the State-government or an international entity to desist or champion from performing any acts or duties.<sup>1</sup> In contemporary times, terrorism is a major risk to societal existence and hence an illegal act under counter terrorism laws of States. Terrorism is also considered a war crime under the laws of war when applied to target non-combatants, such as unprejudiced military personnel or civilians.<sup>2</sup> The symbolism of terrorism can harness human fear to help achieve certain goals.<sup>3</sup>

The word "Terrorism" originates from the French term *terrorisme*,<sup>4</sup> and initially referred to State-terrorism as practiced by the French during the 1793 - 1794 era of terror. The word "terrorisme" is a derivative from a Latin verb *terrere* (e, *terreo*) which means "to frighten".<sup>5</sup> The Terror Cimbricus was a state of emergency and panic in Rome, this was a result of the actions of the warriors of the Cimbri tribe in 105 BC that the Jacobins cited as a precedent when imposing an era of terror during the French Revolution.<sup>6</sup> After the Jacobins lost power, the word "terrorist" became a term of abuse.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> United Nations, "UN Reform", 2005-03-21. Retrieved on 25 April 2016, from <https://web.archive.org/web/20070427012107/http://www.un.org/unifeed/script.asp?scriptId=73>

<sup>2</sup> Ibid

<sup>3</sup> Ruby, Charles, L., "The Definition of Terrorism," 2002

<sup>4</sup> Etymonline.com, "Online Etymology Dictionary", 1979-10-20

<sup>5</sup> Kim Campbell, "When is 'terrorist' a subjective term?", Christian Science Monitor, September 27, 2001.

<sup>6</sup> Geoffrey Nunberg, "Head Games / It All Started with Robespierre / "Terrorism": The history of a very frightening word", San Francisco Chronicle, October 28, 2001.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid

The Al-Qaeda emerged in 1988, and carried out the 11/9/2001 terrorist attack in the United States which has been termed the emergence of contemporary terrorism. This has been worsened by the emergence of its sister terrorist organizations such as Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

The Horn of Africa (HOA) has been troubled by incessant conflicts and the region could be considered as one of the most conflict-prone regions of the world. It is affected by the scourges of chronic political instability, a massive influx of refugees and domestic displaced persons, clandestine migration, humanitarian crisis, and maritime insecurity. All these factors have undermined peace and security in the region, a weakness terrorist organizations have exploited. Pressures to decisively address these threats are testing the limits of national capabilities and resilience. The State is often incapable to meet the elementary needs of local communities, and additionally the secondary needs complicated by political dynamics and instability.

Each of the countries in the Horn of Africa which include Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan and South Sudan suffers/or have suffered protracted political strife, arising from local and national grievances, identity politics and regional inter-state rivalries. The rise of the Union of Islamic Courts in Somalia, the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia to install the President Abdullahi Yusuf in power, the U.S. bombing raids aimed at suspected al-Qaida members, the Ethiopian-Eritrean War, the decade-long Somalia War, the emergence of Al-Shabaab, Kenya's Post election violence, and the Sudan-South Sudanese just ended War have highlighted the display of violence in its extreme form in the Horn of Africa.

The Somali tragedy lies at the heart of developments with internal governance systems. 1991 marked the start of an endless murderous civil war, paving way for the emergence of contemporary terrorists. Terror in Somalia have been continually

featured in international headlines since the past two decades;*firstly as State-terror*, during the civil war that featured clan warfare and humanitarian catastrophe; *secondly as domestic terror*, featured by the failure of the State to prevent the State's geographical boundaries from becoming a terror breeding site and a safe-haven for terrorists; *and lastly as international terror*, where coordinated attacks can be launched from, as evident in the 1998 US embassy bombing and the subsequent attacks on the Kenyan soil.<sup>8</sup>

The Government of Kenya (GoK) was caught flat footed on Saturday, the 21<sup>st</sup> of September, 2013 attack at the Westgate shopping mall.<sup>9</sup> Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility and maintained it was a reprisal attack against the Kenya military operations in Somalia. This incident is marked among other numerous significant attacks in Kenya. Kenya's national security is determined by both domestic and external factors to counter the buildup of terrorism from Somali and within Kenya. The government's responsibility of national interest is ensuring its survival by eliminating any threat that compromises stability and livelihood of its citizens. Countering Terrorism (CT) has further become a challenge to the GoK which includes the recent attempt to bomb the Mandera governor's convoy in 2015,<sup>10</sup> and the Garissa University attack during which 148 students were killed. These persistent attacks increasingly show that terrorists are recruiting, training and executing attacks within Kenya mercilessly with the Kenyan government's capacity to combat them being overwhelmed.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Thomson, Alex, "Somalia's Taliban?" Channel 4, 6 June, 2006. Retrieved on 1 March 2016, from <http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/world/somalias-taliban/165555>;

<sup>9</sup> New York Times, "Gunmen Kill Dozens in Terror Attack at Kenyan Mall", 21 September, 2013. Retrieved on 1 March 2016, from <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/22/world/africa/nairobi-mall-shooting.html?pagewanted=all>

<sup>10</sup> Citizen TV, "Mandera Governor Convoy Attacked By Militia," 13 March 2015. Retrieved on 1 March 2016, from <https://citizentv.co.ke/news/mandera-governor-convoy-attacked-by-militia-70028/>

<sup>11</sup> Kfir, Isaac, "Islamic radicalism in East Africa: Is there a cause for concern?" *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 31(9), 2008: 829–55

Often, strategies used by governments in the Horn of Africa to combat terrorism act are more of hard-power oriented (militaristic). This study seeks to review these CT strategies and suggest diversified, comprehensive, multidimensional and all-inclusive strategies in CT, in Kenya and the Horn of Africa.

## **1.2 Problem Statement**

There have been several studies on terrorism and CT mechanisms in the Horn of Africa and Kenya. The researcher has examined most of these related materials and observed that most of them concentrated on governmental militaristic CT strategies in the Horn of Africa and Kenya, rather than strategies that include all relevant stakeholders such as Non-state Actors (NSA). The most recent of these studies were conducted in 2012 and this study seeks to update researches in this area. In addition, most of the studies did not go into the broader context of addressing the root causes of terrorism with regards to addressing issues related to governance and socio-economic dimensions. Militaristic CT strategies have not won the war. In the continuing search for an effective grand strategy for countering terrorism, there is a need to broaden investigation and analysis to include NSAs and to address more comprehensively, the root causes of terrorism and advance preventive measures that are human security oriented.

### **1.3.0 Research Questions**

In this light, this research looks at a broader domain of actors, causes and measures of CT in Kenya and the Horn of Africa by trying to answer the following questions:

- i. What are the CT mechanisms used in the Horn of Africa?
- ii. What are the CT mechanisms used in Kenya?
- iii. How effective have the CT mechanisms in Kenya been and what grand strategy can be employed to enhance them?



#### **1.4.0 The Objectives**

##### **1.4.1 Broad Objective**

The broad objective of this study is to investigate the performance of existing CT strategies and propose a grand strategy that includes all stakeholders, in the Horn of Africa and Kenya.

##### **1.4.2 Specific objectives**

- i. To investigate counter terrorism mechanisms in the horn of Africa
- ii. To examine the effectiveness of counter terrorism mechanisms in Kenya
- iii. To generate an appropriate and effective strategy of countering terrorism in Kenya and the horn of Africa

#### **1.5.0 Literature Review**

This chapter reviews literature on Terrorism and CT in the Horn of Africa and Kenya. It aims at identifying and evaluating knowledge and findings of various studies that have been carried out in this area. From the literature review, a lot will be mentioned in respect to Terrorism at various levels. The chapter then sets to identify the gaps in literature reviewed.

##### **1.5.1 Terrorism and Threat to Security**

The 11/9/2001 attack by terrorists in the US has indeed raised the awareness about contemporary terrorism; it however did so in a rather narrow manner. Nowadays, it seems that terrorism is equated with Islamic violence and Al-Qaeda in particular. Terrorism is however a broad concept that has its origins in the French Revolution. Therefore, terrorism is not a phenomenon of recent years and is certainly not exclusively related to Islam. Schmidt's typology of terrorism illustrates its broad

character. Schmidt's distinguishes between five types of terrorism: social-revolutionary terrorism (left-wing), right-wing and racist terrorism, single issue terrorism, nationalist and separatist terrorism (including ethnic terrorism), and finally, religious terrorism.<sup>12</sup>

In the previous decades, the typical nature of terror was held on the premise of national patriots and revolutionaries, however, this have changed and proved contrary in the modern day context;thus referred to as the "new-styled terror". In scientific literature, 3differentiating aspects of the new form of terror are: the broader scope of assertions by terrorists, the ruthlessness of violence, and lastly the structural networks of terrorists. With regard to the first characteristic aspect, Giddens states that new-style terrorism has a global spread because it wants to restructure world society.<sup>13</sup>

Together with being global in its ambitions, new-style terrorists use extensive and ruthless ways of violence as well. From this perspective, Gupta stresses that the new form of terror have caused the rise of increased and massive destructions and causalities; this is not unconnected to the advancement in state of the art weapon, technology, transportation and communication systems.<sup>14</sup>

Finally, the organizational structure of terrorist groups is noteworthy when naming distinguishing aspects of new-style terrorism. Terrorist groups are very comparable to so-called network organizations. In other words, the new form of terror groups is highly loosely networked, resulting to a unique levels coordinated operations.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> United States Department of Homeland Security, "Countering Violent Extremism," October 14, 2014. Retrieved on 27 February 2016, from <https://www.dhs.gov/topic/countering-violent-extremism>.

<sup>13</sup> Schmid, A P, "Framework for Conceptualizing Terrorism", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 16, no. 2, 2005, pp. 197 – 221

<sup>14</sup> Gupta, D.K., "Exploring roots of terrorism, in: *Root causes of terrorism: myths, reality and ways forward*," New York: Routledge, 2005.

<sup>15</sup> Sahar Mohammad, A.Y. 'Roots of terrorism in the Middle East' in Tore Bjorgo, *Root Causes of Terrorism*, Routledge, Madison Avenue, 2005

Although these three aspects are being presented as typical for new-style terrorism, one could doubt about this notion. With regard to the first aspect, before 9/11 even before the existence of Al-Qaeda there were groups aimed at restructuring world society. Most notorious examples are of course communist-groups trying to establish communism globally. Also the second aspect of what would be typical for new-style terrorism is only partial true. Indeed, it is correct that 9/11 was the deadliest terrorist attack. However, the statement that the new form of terror is ruthless due to the advancement of technological and weapon development appear overstated, since there are no records of the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) by terrorists. Also with concern to the third aspect of new-style terrorism, one could doubt if this is exclusively typical for new-style terrorism. The network structure is no invention of new-style terrorists since there has been communist-groups using this kind of communication in the beginning of the 20 century.<sup>16</sup>

### **1.5.2 The drivers of Terrorism**

Push factors such as poverty, unemployment, marginalization and discrimination among other factors have been proven to drive terror especially in certain environments. It has been progressively acknowledged that an exhaustive priority and focus have not been given to those identified variables. A study in 2009 indicated that the root causes of terror is driven by pervasive poverty, high unemployment, systematic political exclusion, and additionally, an endemic corruption, lack of political and economic opportunities. The amelioration of those deficiencies involves large-scale investments, which are sustainably implemented.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> U.S. Department of State, *2009 Country Reports on Terrorism*, op. cit.

<sup>17</sup> USAID, "Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism, 2009. Retrieved on 26 February 2016, from [http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/pnadt978.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnadt978.pdf)

In addition, it is often observed that such push factors are common to many global regions, whereas Terrorism remains comparatively rare.<sup>18</sup> Thus, at best these drivers provide insufficient explanations for Terrorism, and it is thus necessary to additionally consider what ‘pulls’ individuals towards violence. This is evident in the reported 100USD average monthly salary of Al-Shabaab’s members<sup>19</sup>. Social status attained as a known and dreaded member of the group also acts as drivers for others to join since such a members is respected, feared and charming for social protection among the community members.<sup>20</sup> Another exceptional driver is the Adventure-seeking, which is considered not as significant as social status seeking.<sup>21</sup>

### **1.5.3 Context, focus, and scope of CT in the Horn of Africa and Kenya**

The programmes implemented through the partnership of U.S and Africa against terror, particularly East Africa, is largely influenced by empirical studies on radicalization with cutting edged methodologies deemed suitable to counter terror.<sup>22</sup> Despite the broad goal of aids and assistance from the U.S to East Africa on issues of security, governance, development, and sustenance of democracy; there has been a specific dedication of a subset to counter-extremism as a component which seeks to address radicalization and counter the terrorist’s ideology. These programs are implemented strategically to target communities considered to be “at-the-risk” of not been a beneficiary of other development programmes that would have otherwise reduced their chance of engaging in or supporting terror.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid

<sup>19</sup> Hassan, M, “Understanding Drivers of Violent Extremism,” CTC Sentinel, 5(8): 18–20, 2012.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid

<sup>21</sup> Ribetti, M, “Unveiled Motivations of Violence in Intra-State Conflicts”, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 18(4): 699–720. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592310701778548> Ploch, 2010; Kilcullen, D, “Accidental Guerrilla”, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009

<sup>22</sup> Bureau of African Affairs, “U.S. Policy in Somalia, Special Briefing by Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary, and Ertharin Cousin, Ambassador to the UN Mission in Rome,” Washington DC, March 12, 2010. Retrieved on 26 February 2016, from <http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2010/138314.htm>

<sup>23</sup> USAID, “Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism, 2009. Retrieved on 26 February 2016, from [http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/pnadt978.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnadt978.pdf)

A 2009 report by USAID emphasizes the importance of categorizing and distinguishing drivers of terror into main domains. Such includes drivers contributing to *firstly*, the recruitment into terrorist organizations; *secondly*, community support or tolerance of their activities; *and thirdly*, enabling terror environment conducive for terror attacks. The report further stresses that counter terror programs ought to be designed with the knowledge of the specific country and community location in regards to the dynamics of radicalization and root causes of terror. This is because the nature and causes of terror varies geographically. Drivers such as socioeconomic, political, and cultural factors are continually reviewed in order to evaluate the appropriate counter terror responses in East Africa.

While those driver are identified, it is however important to note that the majority of those affected by the identified drivers have not resorted to the use of terror to redress their plight and also not certain that the few minority among the affected that resorted to violence were solely driven by those drivers. Therefore, the underlying social and economic conditions, like poverty, unemployment and marginalization, maybe inversely proportional to an increased risk of terror, and may be considered as indirect drivers which exacerbate the cultural and ideological factors exploited by the terrorists.<sup>24</sup>

The pathway of radicalization among Muslim communities varies in East Africa, however there are similar themes. The “victimization narrative” strategy is used by Al-Shabaab and its affiliates’ Al-Qaeda to pull support and sympathy, recruit members, and psychological manipulating. Such strategy is viable in a country like Kenya where there is prevalence of societal discrimination. This is evident in the case where many Muslims in Kenya have expressed social, cultural, political, and economic exclusion from the other parts of the country. In Kenya, the Muslim

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid

population is denser in the former Coast, Northeastern Provinces, and in certain Nairobi neighborhoods. Comparing those areas with the rest of the country, there are historical accounts of poor social service delivery and infrastructural investments in those areas.<sup>25</sup>

In the aftermath of the 1998 bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, counterterrorism efforts and campaigns have focused primarily on deterring the efforts of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates in East Africa. The U.S Department of State (DoS) facilitated the establishment of the East African Counter-Terrorism Initiative (EACTI) and the East African Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSII), both aimed at countering the presence of terror in East Africa.<sup>24</sup> In the mid-2000s, specific counterterrorism operations targeted Somalia due to the increasing exposure of the country to terror operations. The State Department (DoS) focused on enhancing the capacity of the regional and sub-regional entities like the AU, IGAD and Warlords in Somalia against terrorism. Further efforts include the DoS support of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG).

In 2005, the office of the Secretary of State for Africa prioritized on countering terror in Somalia with more robust policy formulation and implementation strategies that ensures an effective counterterrorism.<sup>26</sup> The U.S supported the Somali warlords against the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), and also reinforced the gradual rise of the TFG into a governing and military force. However, the backing of the warlords by the U.S failed to secure the victory of the warlords due to the popularity and mass support of the ICU by the Somalis. This featured and increased emergence of ICU courts and trials using the Sharia law.

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid

<sup>26</sup> Jendayi Frazer was confirmed by the US Senate as Assistant Secretary of State for Africa in June 2005.

After the defeat of the warlords, the office of the Secretary of State for Africa made consultations with Ethiopian leaders leading to the invasion of Somalia by Ethiopia in December 2006. In the wake of the invasion, US military assistance to Ethiopia increased.<sup>27</sup> The office of the Secretary of State and DoS with the support of the African Union's (AU) approved the plan and the need for the presence of peacekeeping force in Somalia. This saw the emergence of AMISOM (trained and equipped forces from Uganda and Burundi) and TFG forces. Between the year 2007 and 2011, the U.S. continued this policy, despite the fact that it has proved ineffective.

The top-down security approach of the U.S in Somalia is best understood in the context of the Bush doctrine on the "Global War on Terror." After the 2001 and 2003 invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq respectively by the U.S, the U.S was forced to find stability in the two countries through "nation-building" having previously destroyed the State.<sup>28</sup> Until 2007, the U.S instituted top-down reconstruction in both countries, neglecting bottom-up initiatives. This approach was repeated by the US in same vain as applied to the strategy in Somalia before a reproach.<sup>29</sup>

The top-down approach of the US continued through 2010. In the continental approach by Africa to deal with issue of peace in the region, is the establishment of the Djibouti peace process, an African-led initiative which enjoys the support of the UN, Arab League, Organization of Islamic Conference, IGAD, AU and States within the region. The peace process identifies the significance of an inclusive Somali government which has a role in regional security.<sup>30</sup>

Between 2007 and 2012, it cost the U.S about \$650 million in the training,

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<sup>27</sup>Briefing, US Embassy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, March 14, 2012.

<sup>28</sup>James Dobbins et al, "America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq," Rand, 2003.

<sup>29</sup>James Dobbins et al, "The UN's Role in Nation-building: From the Congo to Iraq", Rand, 2005.

<sup>30</sup>Bureau of African Affairs, "U.S. Policy in Somalia, Special Briefing by Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary, and Ertharin Cousin, Ambassador to the UN Mission in Rome," Washington DC, March 12, 2010. Retrieved on 26 February 2016, from <http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2010/138314.htm>

equipping and supporting of AMISOM forces; about half of the cost between 2007 and 2012 –\$385 million was spent by the Department of States ACOTA program on Ugandan and Burundian forces between 2008 and 2011. This program was aimed at weakening Al-Shabaab, a group that came to light after the ICU was ousted by December 2006 Ethiopian invasion. From 2007, the emerged militant entities from Somaliabattled with the Ethiopian forces and occupied large parts of the Somali State's capital, Mogadishu, the South-Central Somalia Mogadishu and the port of Kismayo. In 2007, Al-Shabaabthreatened to attack the West and its allies, including European targets. Two years after this threat, the Ethiopia withdrew its support leaving AMSIOM and the TFGwith little hope of success. The TFGtasked with the creation of pathways to reconstituting the government in Somalia failed to sustain its mandate due to corruptionand other factors.<sup>31</sup>In consideration of the capacity of State to protect its citizen and ensure development, Somalia, was regarded as a failed State.

However, in 2011, AMISOM and the TFG were able to secure Mogadishu from the control of Al-Shabaab. With the support of Ethiopian and Kenyan forces additional gains were made in the South-Central Somalia like Kismayo and Jubaland.<sup>32</sup>At the very end of significant territories held by Al-Shabaab was the October 2012 takeover of the port city of Kismayo from Al-Shabaab's control. This led to a favourable peace environment featuring the constitution of an administrative structure and election of Somalia's president in late 2012. Despite the effort of the new administration the security apparatus by the national forces and other coordinated effort in countering the operations of Al-Shabaab appears to be weak,

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<sup>31</sup>Le Sage, "Somalia's Endless Transition," 2010, p.1. The main clans in South-Central Somalia are the Hawiye, Darod, and Rahanwein. Other major Somali clans are the Issak in Somaliland and the Ogaden in Ethiopia (who are also in Jubaland straddling the Kenya-Somalia border).

<sup>32</sup>Ken Menkhaus, "After the Kenyan Intervention," Enough Project, January 2012, pp.1- 15. Retrieved on 25 February 2016, from <http://www.enoughproject.org/files/MenkhausKenyaninterventionSomalia.pdf>



thus giving a rise of Al-Shabaab attacks not only within Somalia but also in neighboring countries like Kenya.

#### **1.5.4 Gaps in Literature review**

The researcher has reviewed some of the relevant literature related to the theme of this study and has come to the conclusion that studies have been focused on state-centric emphasis on countering terrorism, ignoring to a greater extent the potentials of Non-state Actors in CT. This goes into the broader context of addressing the root causes of terrorism with regards to addressing issues related to governance and socio-economic dimensions. Therefore, this research seeks to look at a broader domain of participatory efforts of states and non-state actors in combating terrorism in the Horn of Africa and Kenya.

#### **1.6 Justification of Research**

To the academia, this study intends to contribute to researches about CT measures in Kenya and the Horn of Africa by bridging the gaps in previous studies part of which was the non-inclusion of NSAs in the fight against terrorism.

The recommendations from the study will contribute to informing and improving on policy matters of government and other relevant stakeholders by offering an appropriate and effective strategy to fight terrorism.

#### **1.7 Theoretical Framework**

This study will be based on International Relations (IR) theory of Constructivism. Constructivism theory at the most rudimentary level is concerned with the role of collective human consciousness – the role of ideas in IR. It seeks to understand international activity in terms of interaction of actors and intangible ideational structures (group norms in particular). This can be identified as an offshoot of Idealism, stating the collective efforts against Terrorism. The term Constructivism

was coined by Nicholas Onuf, to describe the socially constructed characters in IR.<sup>33</sup> This theory was later expanded by Alexander Wendt in his 1992 article: *Anarchy is what states make of it*. In the article, he challenged realists and neoliberals commitment to material power and asserts that structures of human associations are determined primarily by shared ideas rather material forces and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by this shared ideas rather than given by nature.<sup>34</sup> Since 11/9/2001 attacks in the US, traditional IR scholars have been finding it difficult to understand acts of terror. Realists and liberalists approaches hardly make substantial contributions to the understanding of significant attacks that are motivated by multidimensional convictions. Constructivist theories are best suited to explain groups like Al-Shabaab, ISIS, Boko Haram etc. Constructivist theories help to analyse how identities and interests can change overtime, furthermore Constructivism is essential in understanding the ever changing state responses to VE. It further emphasizes the importance of understanding culture, identity, religion and ideas through IR theories.<sup>35</sup> The challenge of traditional IR theories in predictions of the post-cold-war craved a spot for the emergence of Constructivism in order to fill such gap. Constructivism is identified as the social theory of International Politics. According to Alexander Wendt, identities expresses who or what actors are and how they have developed, been sustained or have transformed, although interests refer to what actors want and interactions shows the true identities.<sup>36</sup>

Terrorism is a social construction as what sociological thinkers believe it to be. It is an interpretation of events and their presumed causes (one person's terrorist is another's freedoms fighter.) CT as a social construct gives insight into policies for

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<sup>33</sup> David Schild, "Constructivism as a basis for understanding International Terrorism: a Case study of Al Qaeda," University of Johannesburg, 2011.

<sup>34</sup> Wendt, A., "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics", International Organisation, Vol. 46 (2), 1992.

<sup>35</sup> David Schild, "Constructivism as a basis for understanding International Terrorism: a Case study of Al Qaeda," University of Johannesburg, 2011.

<sup>36</sup> Wendt, A., "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations", International Organisation, Vol. 46 (2), 1987

such.<sup>37</sup> Terrorism can be constructed as a war, crime, or an uncivilized evil. This contributes to the formulation of certain counter terrorism policies such as immigration policies, military reactions and judicial measures, while excluding responses such as negotiations and induced socio-economic changes that can alter the motivations for terrorism.<sup>38</sup> More often than not, acts of terror by terrorists were perceived as war against the West due to their militaristic response to terrorism. Terrorism looked at as both a war and a crime. Terrorists use the basic tenets of constructivism such as ideas, identities and norms. For example, Al-Qaeda seeks to promote an Islamic identity, define the interest of all Muslims as necessarily being in confrontation with the West. Here, ideas matter and persuasion is key. The failure of rationalists to understand Constructivists orientation of terrorism led to state-centric policies on War on Terror.<sup>39</sup>

Constructivists believe that states will act differently to friends and enemies based on their threat perceptions, their behaviors will be shaped by their shared understanding and collective knowledge of self and the other. Constructivism is also a cultural theory explained by different cultures of anarchy such as Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian. The cultural aspects may help to explain the approach in fighting terrorism.<sup>40</sup>

Constructivism views terrorism as a social problem that cannot exist, independent of the ideas of the people involved in it. The value added by constructivism to war on terror includes the creation of diverse notions, the understanding of self and others which help to understand states' responses to

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<sup>37</sup> David Schild, "Constructivism as a basis for understanding International Terrorism: a Case study of Al Qaeda," University of Johannesburg, 2011.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid

<sup>39</sup> Ibid

<sup>40</sup> Wendt, A., "Social Theory of International Politics", Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999

terrorism, disclosing the ever changing notion of ideas and identities.<sup>41</sup> Lastly, Constructivism can be used to explain, terrorism and those who join it, through certain pull and push factors as highlighted below.

**Table 1.1 – Push and Pull Factors**

<b>Push Factors towards terrorism</b>	<b>Pull Factors towards terrorism</b>
Poverty and unemployment	Radicalized religious environment
Marginalization	Misinterpretation of religious teachings
Police harassment	Concept of global Muslim caliphate
Police/immigration corruption	Lack of effective counter narratives
Racial/ethnic profiling	State centric approach to fighting terrorism
Youth estrangement and frustration	
Cultural threat perception	

Source: the Researcher

Furthermore, importance is tied to ensuring peace and security through the role of interdisciplinary/multi-dimensional actors through the role of ideas, the interdependence of global cooperation and economic development, democracy, social justice, morals, and law and order.

## 1.8 Hypotheses

- i. State centric CT measures in the horn of Africa that excludes non-state actors have failed to combat terrorism
- ii. Increased acts of terror have been consequences of the Kenyan Government institutions focusing only on militaristic strategies, ignoring non-militaristic ones.
- iii. A combined effort by both the state and Non-state actors will succeed in fighting terrorism.

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<sup>41</sup> Wendt, A., "On Constitution and Causation in International Relations", Review of International Studies, Vol. 24 (special issue), 1998.

## **1.9.0 Methodology of Research**

### **1.9.1 Research Design**

This study used mixed method research design for data collection and data analysis.

The research strategy of this study is a Case Study of CT in Kenya. Both primary and secondary data was used.

### **1.9.2 Methods of Data Collection**

#### **Primary data**

Primary data was collected through structured interviews with knowledgeable persons and technocrats from the concerned departments of government's agencies such as the Kenyan Anti-Terrorism Police Unit; and the civil society such Kenya Community Support Center (KECOSCE). The government officials were interviewed on the mechanisms put in place for CT as well as on how effective these mechanisms have been; while the CSO personnel was interviewed on their de-radicalization and countering violent extremism programs. The samples of interviewees were 4: 3 from ATPU and 1 from KECOSCE.

#### **Secondary data**

Secondary data was collected by analyzing the literature in academic journals, policy documents, periodicals, books, newspapers, and academic papers and magazines, TV documentaries on the research questions of this study.

### **1.9.3 Data analysis**

This research used content analysis. Qualitative data was analyzed using content analysis to reduce the wide variety of information to a more limited set of attributes composing a variable. It was used to draw conclusions on the drivers/causes of Terrorism; CT mechanisms put in place in Kenya as well as on the effectiveness of these mechanisms.

#### **1.9.4 Research Ethics**

Considerations like professional practice – like ensuring data validity and research instruments reliability, and research ethics was adhered to by the researcher. The study observed confidentiality, non-forceful respondent compliance and consent of the respondent. Research approval was obtained from the University of Nairobi (UoN) and field research permit was obtained from the National Council for Science and Technology.

#### **1.10 Scope and Limitations of Study**

Data for this research will be collected from relevant institutions and target populations in Nairobi. This is partly because Nairobi has witnessed some of terror attacks at varying proportions.

Issues related to national security are highly sensitive and remain classified therefore the researcher finds it difficult to effectively gather primary and secondary data on CT mechanisms from NCTC, Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), Muslim for Human Rights, and Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM). The researcher ensured the respondents confidentiality. Additionally, accessibility to some of the respondents might be a challenge due to the nature of their work. However, the researcher was rigorous in reaching ATPU and KECOSE in order to gather enough data to be able to draw objective solutions.

#### **1.11 Chapter Outline**

This study will be organized into six chapters.

Chapter one: **Introduction to the Study.** This chapter contains the Background to the Study, Problem Statement, The Broad Objective and Specific Objectives, Literature Review, Justification of Research, Theoretical Framework,

Hypotheses, Methodology of Research, Scope and Limitations of Study, and Chapter Outline.

Chapter two: **An Investigation of Counter Terrorism Mechanisms in the Horn of Africa**. This chapter captures an overview of Terrorism in the Horn of Africa. Thereafter, it will critically examine the mechanisms used in CT, in the Horn of Africa.

Chapter three: **Effectiveness of Counter Terrorism Measures in Kenya**. This chapter starts with an overview of Terrorism in Kenya. It will then focus on investigating and examining the effectiveness CT mechanisms in the country.

Chapter four: **Strategies for Countering Terrorism in Kenya and the Horn of Africa (Grand Strategy)**. This chapter focuses on identifying comprehensible, long term approaches to countering terrorism in Kenya.

Chapter five: **Data Presentation and Analysis**. This chapter focuses on data analysis and presentation.

Chapter six: **Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations**.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **AN INVESTIGATION OF COUNTERTERRORISM MECHANISMS USED IN THE HORN OF AFRICA**

#### **2.0 Introduction**

The Horn of Africa does not rhyme with development, wealth, or peace. Ethiopia is currently making measurable progress because of its oppressive government. Somalia has become a run-off-the-mill case study for every potential failed state in the world and is currently more abandoned than ever by the international community. In Eritrea, thousands of migrants are escaping a brutal dictatorship; while Kenya, a relative success story, has been doing its best to combat terrorism. It now becomes a question by pundits, whether these countries are effectively trying to combat terrorism and enforce human rights by all means possible, or their governments are now taking advantage of these domestic challenges and regional conflicts for their own political benefit.

In actuality, the region has experienced continued and devastating intra-and inter-state conflicts, leading to instability, political isolation and poverty. This makes it vulnerable to terrorist exploitation. Terrorism in the HOA is a complicated issue requiring a broad and continued approach for a solution. Critical knowledge about terrorist's motivations and objectives are important as it informs the basis of counterterror operations. The Al-Shabaab aims to take over the governance and administration of Somalia and additionally replaces the existing civic law with strict Islamic laws.

In line with the first objective of this study, this chapter starts by capturing an overview of terrorism in the Horn of Africa. It carefully looks at the trends, causes and drivers. Thereafter, it critically examines the Counter Terrorism mechanisms in



the Horn of Africa. In doing this, it looks at the efforts by regional and international actors in the fight against terror within HOA.

## **2.1 Terrorism in the Horn of Africa**

### **2.1.1 Overview of Terror Acts**

For almost three decades, the HOA has contributed to global terrorism as a major victim and/or perpetrator of terror in the world. These terror acts are directed to national within that country for a local motive and/or to non-nationals of that country for the perceived opposition of their goals of terror acts.<sup>42</sup> It started with the 1975 Nairobi bombing, in which there were two bomb blasts in a nightclub and a travel agency office. Thereafter, were the 1980 Norfolk Hotel attack in Kenya<sup>43</sup>; which was followed by the 1989 power seizure by the National Islamic Front in Sudan, with the intentions of building an Islamist State.<sup>44</sup> Sudan is said to have opened her doors for free entry to refugee terrorists in the 1990s, this is evident by the presence of the leader of Al-Qaeda –Osama bin Laden and his followers within the boundaries of Sudan. This paved way for free passage route, safe haven and terror operations without counter threats for other terror affiliates of Al-Qaeda within the HOA.<sup>45</sup>

In 1993, and in Mogadishu, Somalia, 18 American soldiers were killed during a terrorist attack; and 5 years afterwards, was the memorable and significant terror strike in the HOA, bombing American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. In this attack, more than 200 people were killed and over 4,000 injured.<sup>46</sup> In October 2000, the U.S. Navy was faced with 17 casualties when terror stuck a Ship at sea off the coast of Africa and close to Yemen. In the same light, in

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<sup>42</sup> Rosand, E, Millar, A., and Ipe, J., "Enhancing Counter-terrorism in Eastern Africa," African Security Review, 18:2, 2007

<sup>43</sup> Patrick, Kimunguyi., "Terrorism and Counter terrorism in East Africa", Global Terrorism Research Centre and Monash European and EU Centre Monash University, 2011.

<sup>44</sup> The United States Institute of Peace, "Special Report - Terrorism in the Horn of Africa," Washington DC, January 2004.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid

<sup>46</sup> Ibid

November 2002, there were Al-Qaeda backed coordinated attacks in Mombasa; firstly on an Israeli-owned and the other was an attempt to shoot-down an Israeli airliner.<sup>47</sup>

Admittedly, the HOA has been weak due to prolonged conflicts and warring states in the region and thus a favourable region for terror activities to thrive. However there have been tremendous efforts especially after the September attack in the U.S; America and her allies have continually increased CT efforts in the HOA since reduction of terror and affiliates of terror in the region will be significant in the global fight against terror. In July 2010, there were terror attacks on football watching spots in Kampala and also the bombing of a Kampala-bound bus in Nairobi in the December.<sup>48</sup>

### **2.1.2 Al-Shabaab, its operations and organization structure**

Contemporary terror threats in the HOA come from the terrorist organization, Al-Shabaab. The terror organization was founded in 2004 and has about 9,000 militants as at 2014.<sup>49</sup> The group is labelled and considered a terror group by most countries.<sup>50</sup> Al-Shabaab is typified as a dispersed entity with its ruling class picked from different opposing clans and thus raising the possibility of internal political divisions. The preponderance of its fighters was interested mostly in the nationalistic battle against the TFG in Mogadishu and was later supportive of global Jihad. Most of its high ranking leadership is believed to have trained in Afghanistan and orchestrated the bombings in Kampala, Uganda, on July 11th, 2010.<sup>51</sup> However, considering its mechanisms and day to day operations, Al-Shabaab can be compared to the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid

<sup>48</sup> Patrick Kimung'yi, "Terrorism and Counter terrorism in East Africa", Global Terrorism Research Centre and Monash European and EU Centre Monash University, 2011

<sup>49</sup> Mcclatchydc.com, "Al-Shabaab led by "dozens of foreign jihadists, most from Arab nations", November 18, 2008. Retrieved on 22 June 2016, from <http://web.archive.org/web/20091207062210/http://www.mcclatchydc.com:80/world/story/56098.html>

<sup>50</sup> Peter Tase, "Terrorism, War and Conflict, an analysis into the Horn of Africa," Academicus - International Scientific Journal, 2012

<sup>51</sup> Ibid

After the participation of TFG and AMISOM in retaking Mogadishu in 2005, Al-Shabaab has since engaged in numerous and uncountable terror attacks.<sup>52</sup> Al-Shabaab leaders unremittingly call on the rebellion against TFG and AMISOM.

The organization has affiliation and stronger ties with Al-Qaeda, and with an increasing influence of command in neighboring nations and Islamic countries. Terror entities in Africa like the Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda and Boko Haram have forged an alliance and coordinate attacks against the West and other entities that oppose their goal and ideology.<sup>53</sup>

Al-Shabaab spreads their propaganda through various media outfits. It controls its own radio station, Radio Andalus. It has acquired relay stations and captured other equipment from private radio stations, including some from the BBC.<sup>54</sup> Regardless, the radio, the Internet is the most heavily utilized by Al-Shabaab as it is the easiest and cheapest way to reach a large audience. They have been using online forums and chat rooms to recruit young followers. It had a website which has been taken down where it featured posts, videos and official statements in Arabic, English, and Somali. Before mid-2011, Al-Shabaab was managing a propaganda television station the year before. The organization has also made use of a Twitter account with the name HSM Press,<sup>55</sup> which attracted over eight thousand followers. The account was later suspended by Twitter in January 2013. The group later opened a new Twitter account on February 4, 2013,<sup>56</sup> which Twitter closed again on 6 September, 2011. As at 2015, the organization has retreated from the major cities, controlling a few rural areas.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> Peter Tase, "Terrorism, War and Conflict, an analysis into the Horn of Africa," Academicus - International Scientific Journal, 2012

<sup>53</sup> Ibid

<sup>54</sup> ABC News, "Al Qaeda Group Is Back on Twitter After Ban", 4 February 2013.

Retrieved on 22 June 2016, from <http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/al-qaeda-group-back-twitter-ban/story?id=18400844>

<sup>55</sup> Ibid

<sup>56</sup> Ibid

<sup>57</sup> VOA, "UN Points to Progress in Battling Al-Shabab in Somalia", 3 January 2015.

### **2.1.3 Vulnerabilities of the Horn of Africa to terrorism**

There are several causes or drivers of terrorism in the Horn of Africa, though some of them have been mentioned briefly in this study. Firstly is severe conflicts which are caused by weak governance and statelessness. Ethiopia, example has been simultaneously at war with several rebel groups and against Eritrea.<sup>58</sup> One of the main drivers of the conflict has been territorial disputes. In addition, Ethiopia has accused Eritrea of supporting terror by Al-Shabaab in Ethiopian territory. This has led to continual conflict, destruction, deaths and abuse of Human rights within the two countries<sup>59</sup>, and withdrawal of Eritrea from IGAD.

In a similar note, in northern Uganda, insurgent groups especially the Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which fight against Kampalais considered to have employed terror tactics.<sup>60</sup> South Sudan recently emerged from its war, which saw a large scale of humanitarian crisis, rights abuses and deaths. Somalia has been in crisis for God knows how long.

Secondly, the porous borders which have led to the free flow of weapons and persons considered to be threat to security. This presents a challenging task of national security of various governments in the HOA.<sup>61</sup>

Finally, there are several reasons why the HOA has become a battlefield for jihadists and their foes. One is the spread of radical Islam which has been linked to poor socio-economic condition & widespread poverty, and a deep sense of marginalization of several groups in the countries in the region. This enabled Islamists

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Retrieved on 22 June 2016, from <http://www.voanews.com/articleprintview/2584631.html>

<sup>58</sup> McGregor (2007), A., "Ethiopia Faces Ethnic Fallout from Somalia Intervention," *Terrorism Focus*, Volume 4, No. 17, June.

<sup>59</sup> Amnesty International, "Human Rights Violations in Ethiopia," Report, at <http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/ethiopia/report-2010#>

<sup>60</sup> International Crisis Group, "Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State," ICG Africa Report 45, Nairobi/Brussels, 23 May, 2002

<sup>61</sup> Rabasa, A., "Radical Islam in East Africa," RAND Project Airforce, RAND Cooperation, 2009a

to leverage on this<sup>62</sup> by proliferating their ideas and winning allies amongst impoverished Muslim minorities and desperate refugees.<sup>63</sup> Terror groups were able to take advantage of the 1989 coup in Somalia, and the unrest in Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea.<sup>64</sup> Two is the HOA's geographical proximity and historical linkages with the Middle East which catalyzed the movements of terrorist agents within and across the two regions. Three countries in the HOA are either dominantly Muslim or have significant Muslim minorities: Comoros (98%), Djibouti (94%), Eritrea (50%), Ethiopia (50%), Kenya (10%), Somalia (including the self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland, 100%), Sudan (70%), Tanzania (35%) and Uganda (16%).<sup>65</sup> This has exposed them to international terrorism and sectarian conflicts. Four, the expansion of democracy from the 1990s activated activism which was inspired by radical Islamic ideas among disaffected Muslim minorities, majorly at the coast.<sup>66</sup>

## **2.2 CT Strategies in the Horn of Africa - the roles of International and regional bodies**

On CT strategies in the region, International actors such as the UN, the EU, the US and regional actors such as the AU and IGAD have been playing enormous roles. This is because of several advantages that they have: Firstly, they have the knowledge and expertise of local issues that makes them well tailored to develop mechanisms that take into account cultural and other contextual issues.<sup>67</sup> Through this, they can undertake region- or sub-region-specific initiatives that complement and build upon global CT objectives. They are also in a position to increase a sense of local ownership of global initiatives; and fostering interest and maintaining momentum that

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<sup>62</sup> Rosand, E, Millar, A., and Ipe, J., "Enhancing Counter-terrorism in Eastern Africa," *African Security Review*, 18:2, 2007, p. 11

<sup>63</sup> A de Waal, "Islamism and its enemies in the Horn of Africa," Shama Books, Addis Ababa, 2004.

<sup>64</sup> Patrick Kimunguyi, "Terrorism and Counter terrorism in East Africa", Global Terrorism Research Centre and Monash European and EU Centre Monash University, 2011

<sup>65</sup> Lyman, P. N., Morrison, J. S., "The terrorist threat in Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2004, pp 75–86

<sup>66</sup> Hoorweg, J., Foeken D., Obudho, R. A., (eds), "Kenya handbook: Culture, resources and development in the East African Littoral," Hamburg & London: Lit Verlag Munster, 2000.

<sup>67</sup> Patrick Kimunguyi, "Terrorism and Counter terrorism in East Africa", Global Terrorism Research Centre and Monash European and EU Centre Monash University, 2011

is significant enough to counter terror. Secondly, is the facilitation of expertise and information exchange among the multi- governmental and non-governmental entities in HOA.<sup>68</sup> In addition is the sharing of good national practices and lessons learned from national implementation among the countries in the HOA.

### **2.2.1 The African Union and Counter terrorism in the HOA**

The AU has been praised for its efforts and successes in the war against Al-Shabaab through AMISOM. With respect to countering terror, the AU and its predecessor OAU have engaged in a number of treaties and operations to ensure that the region is free from threats of terror. These include the Organization of African Unity (OAU) counter-terrorism convention (1999), which was adopted in reaction to the 1998 al Qaida strikes in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam; the AU CT plan of action (2002); and the AU protocol to the convention (2004). These treaties all entail provisions on capacity building, extradition, the exchange of information, and other elements aimed at strengthening cooperation in the area of CT on the continent. However, the AU has several challenges facing the implementation of these treaties. One is the dissimilarity in the level of perception of terror threats levels among AU member states. Two is the AU's inability to generate resources sufficient enough to counter terror through policy formulation and implementation.

The AU in 2004 instituted the African Centre for Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) to specifically relate with issues of terror with the aim of educating member state and improve the State's capability to deal with terror.

### **2.2.2 The European Union and Counter terrorism in the HOA**

The EU has espoused a very broad approach to CT cooperation with Africa. Most EU policy and diplomatic interventions in Africa are undertaken within the chassis of

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<sup>68</sup> Ibid

Cotonou Partnership Agreement and the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership Agreement.<sup>69</sup> Both call for cooperation in many areas, including security, politics and development. As set out in its Action Plan to Combat Terrorism,<sup>70</sup> the EU seeks to address root causes of terrorism and tackle the factors that lead to the enlisting and radicalization of people by radical Islamist organizations. Root causes include the introduction of democracy, eradication of poverty and protection of rule of law and human rights. Violent radicalization may concurrently be an aid to terrorism and a threat to democracy in developing countries. Hence, by creating a conducive environment for democracy, there is a chance of “killing two birds with one stone”<sup>71</sup>.

The Political and Security Committee of the European Union and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union have partnered on a common goal to deal with the issues of terror and security. This includes the ensured functioning of the African Union’s African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), specifically with regards to the African Standby Force and Continental Early Warning System.<sup>72</sup> The EU funded the APSC with one billion Euros, in a separate program through IGAD. Additionally, the EU continually supports peace and development process in Somalia and has also militarily trained the Somali forces through the EU Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia).<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> In the area of terrorism, Article 11a of the 2005 Revised Cotonou Partnership Agreement states that the Parties (EU and ACP states) “condemn all acts of terrorism and undertake to combat terrorism through international cooperation, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, relevant conventions and instruments and in particular full implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1456 (2003) and other relevant UN resolutions”. Hence they have agreed to exchange information on terrorist groups and their support networks and views on means and methods to counter terrorist acts, including in technical fields and training and experiences in relations to the prevention of terrorism.

<sup>70</sup> European Commission, “Revised Cotonou Partnership Agreement,” EC Article 11a 2005. And EUTM Somalia, “EU Common and Security Policy”, Retrieved on 21 June 2016 from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1870&lang=en>

<sup>71</sup> Makinda, S., “The European Union and the Fight Against Terrorism and its Impact on Democracy Building in Africa,” International Institute Against Electoral Assistance, 2009, p.8.

<sup>72</sup> Patrick Kimunguyi, “Terrorism and Counter terrorism in East Africa”, Global Terrorism Research Centre and Monash European and EU Centre Monash University, 2011

<sup>73</sup> Ibid

### **2.2.3 Intergovernmental Authority on Development and Counter terrorism in the HOA**

The IGAD Capacity Building Program Against Terrorism (ICPAT) initiated in 2006 focused on building the capacities of member state<sup>74</sup>by: working to promote greater inter-agency coordination on CT within individual IGAD member states; strengthening border control; and providing training and sharing information.

In late 2007, the ICPAT initiated IGAD ministerial-level meetings on counterterrorism. The first meeting held in September same year, in Kampala, affirms its call on member States to adopt an encompassing administrative, regulatory and legal approach in countering terror. This coordinated effort paved way for the establishment of Inter-ministerial counterterrorism mechanisms in member States aimed at: upholding the rule of law with regards to human rights during counterterrorism; coordinated exchange of intelligence, information and expertise. The Kampala conference also urged member States to not only adopt but implement the UN Global counterterrorism strategy among other international instruments against terror.<sup>75</sup> However, the program was challenged by the withdrawal of Eritrea from IGAD and the limited cooperation of member states to implement IGAD CT policies.<sup>76</sup>

### **2.2.4 The United Nations and Counterterrorism in the HOA**

In 2006, the General Assembly of the UN (UNGA) unanimously adopted the Global strategy to counter terror (UNGC-T Strategy)calling on an all-inclusiveapproach in countering terror. This stressed the need to strengthen the role and commitments of State and non-State actors, and regional and sub-regional entities in the fight against

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<sup>74</sup> Ibid

<sup>75</sup> Inter Governmental Authority on Development, "The Kampala Statement - Meeting of Ministers of Justice of IGAD member states on legal cooperation against terrorism," Kampala, Uganda, 20–21 September 2007. Retrieved on 21 June 2016, from [http://www.igad.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=70&Itemid=65](http://www.igad.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=70&Itemid=65)

<sup>76</sup> Patrick Kimunguyi, "Terrorism and Counter terrorism in East Africa", Global Terrorism Research Centre and Monash European and EU Centre Monash University, 2011



terror.<sup>77</sup> Those efforts culminated to the institution of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force of the UN (UNCT Task Force). The UNGC-T Strategy presented an all-agreeing framework by member States and gave significant unique prospects on improving the HOA regional and UN cooperation against terror. The UN counterterror action plan is heavily reliant on four main pillars which include: addressing conducive conditions that spreads terror; strengthening capacity building to prevent and foil terror acts; and lastly, establishment and implementation of counterterror frameworks that respects the rule of law and human rights. The plan strengthens what many HOA terrorism pundits have long believed, which is that an effective CT strategy must combine preventative measures that address real and perceived grievances and the underlying political and socio-economic issues.<sup>78</sup>

### **2.2.5 The US Counterterrorism Programs in the HOA**

The United States Institute of Peace in 2003 organized a forum for U.S foreign policy experts on Africa and CT specialists in the HOA; with the aim of establishing the level of dangers of terrorism and determining the appropriate CT response within the HOA. A similar but simple and systematic outline to counter terror in the HOA was provided by CT specialists from the region.<sup>79</sup>

The U.S military coordination in HOA is operated from Djibouti and referred to as the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). The CJTF-HOA provides support for Burundian and Ugandan forces in Somalia after the fall of the ICU, supports the AU member state's contributing troops in Somalia and also supports the training and development of States in HOA.<sup>80</sup> While the U.S operation from its military base in Djibouti has helped in sustaining stability within Djibouti and

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<sup>77</sup>Rosand, E, Millar, A., and Ipe, J., "Enhancing Counter-terrorism in Eastern Africa," *African Security Review*, 18:2., 2007, p. 103

<sup>78</sup> Ibid

<sup>79</sup> The United States Institute of Peace, "Special Report - Terrorism in the Horn of Africa," Washington DC, January 2004.

<sup>80</sup> Patrick Kimunguyi, "Terrorism and Counter terrorism in East Africa", Global Terrorism Research Centre and Monash European and EU Centre Monash University, 2011

member states of HOA within the belt of the Gulf of Aden; it is however important to note that, those operation have focused less on governance due the State's right to sovereignty and thus undermining long term success of suppressing terror within the HOA.<sup>81</sup> Currently, the CJTF-HOA is face with challenges of effective and continued operations due to inadequate national CT specialists and language barrier for foreign CT specialists. To strengthen the efficacy of CJTF-HOA, 's interaction with regional militaries, the foundational status of CJTF-HOA needs to focus on long term and sustainable solutions to CT, with respect to issues of governance; and additionally address the issue of training nationals in HOA to become experts rather than importing experts that have less regional linguistic and cultural acquaintance.<sup>82</sup>

Furthermore, the U.S has the capacity to influence peace within the HOA region if pressure can be exerted on governments within the region that are heavily funded by the U.S donor funds. This is exceptionally important for the case of reducing the tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Both administrations ran on an authoritarian pattern can be diplomatically compelled to reduce hostility and tension by the threat to reduce or withdraw the U.S donor funds.<sup>83</sup> This strategy can as well be extended to non-U.S fund donors to warring or hostile States in the HOA.<sup>84</sup> This would indeed help to decrease the threat of conflicts with its potentials of steering favorable conditions for terrorism to thrive.

In furtherance, such systematic strategy of persuasion is significant to reducing State-sponsored terror: as it applies to Ogaden National Liberation Front and Oromo Liberation Front both supported by Eritrea in order to weaken Ethiopia; likewise the Eritrean National Front and the Eritrean Liberation Front are both supported by

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<sup>81</sup> Robert Jones and David H Gray, "Bolstering Governance: The Need for a Multifaceted Approach to United States Counterterrorism Policy in the Horn of Africa Region," *Global Security Studies*, Fall 2013, Volume 4, Issue 4

<sup>82</sup> Rabasa, A, "Radical Islam in East Africa", Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2009, p. 76

<sup>83</sup> Robert Jones and David H Gray, "Bolstering Governance: The Need for a Multifaceted Approach to United States Counterterrorism Policy in the Horn of Africa Region," *Global Security Studies*, Fall 2013, Volume 4, Issue 4

<sup>84</sup> Lyons, T., "Avoiding Conflict in the Horn of Africa: U.S. Policy Toward Ethiopia and Eritrea", Council on Foreign Relations Special Report, (21), 2006, p. 28

Ethiopia in order to weaken Eritrea. There is also a need for the US to foster sufficient governance in Somalia, Sudan and largely in South Sudan that have been in an unending conflict.

In 2009, the US established the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT). It is a multi-year, multidimensional program designed to build the capacity and cooperation of military, law enforcement, and civilian actors across the HOA to CT. It uses military, law enforcement and development resources to achieve its strategic objectives, including: reducing the operational capacity of terrorist networks; strengthening border security; countering the financing of terrorism; and reducing the appeal of radicalization and recruitment to violent extremism. Active PREACT partners include Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda. Comoros, Rwanda, Seychelles, South Sudan, and Sudan are also members of PREACT.<sup>85</sup>

In 2014, the US government, through PREACT, continued to build the capacity and resilience of the HOA governments to suppress the spread of, and ultimately counter the threat posed by Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab, and other terrorist organizations. PREACT accompanies the Washington's dedicated efforts, including support for AMISOM, to promote stability and governance in Somalia and the HOA. It has coordinated joint training exercises for Kenyan, Tanzanian, and Ugandan first responders and law enforcement professionals to support efforts to enhance regional coordination and cooperation, protect shared borders, and respond to terrorist incidents. Similarly, training for Kenyan and Ugandan prosecutors has supported efforts to improve prosecutorial capacity to adjudicate terrorism cases.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> The US Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2014, Chapter 2. Country Reports: Africa Overview, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM. Retrieved on 21 June 2016 from <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239404.htm>

<sup>86</sup> Ibid

### **2.3 Conclusion**

The findings of this chapter reveals that understanding the vulnerabilities of HOA member states to terror and its root causes is important in order to ensure a strengthened and sustained counter terror effort. It was also clear that external actors have a major role to help in raising the capacities of countries and organizations in the region. The findings also show that according to the first hypothesis of this study, the concentration on state-centric CT mechanisms which are often militaristic can be counter-productive; this is a clear reflection on the effectiveness of the 2006 U.S-Ethiopian led invasion in Somalia. The dependency on conventional military tactics in terrorism has leads to unending consequences and has undermined the fight against terror massive casualties, further causing massive sympathy for terrorists. Terrorists sympathizers are conditioned in a way that creates a favourable environment for indirect support like terror safe havens or direct support of terror.

Finally, it is important to strengthen international, regional, governmental and non-governmental effort with coordinated harmonization and likewise separation of effort in order to ensure an effective CT strategy. Additionally, it is significant to ensure the maximization of all CT actors with respect to their respective comparative advantage and capacities.

Over and above, the findings of this chapter indicated that the first objective of this research study i.e. investigating the counter terrorism mechanisms in HOA, proved that militaristic approach is the main strategy used in HOA. This militaristic approach has failed to stem the tide of terrorism.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **EFFECTIVENESS OF COUNTER TERRORISM MECHANISMS IN KENYA**

#### **3.0 Introduction**

In the previous chapter, we carefully examined the trends, causes and drivers of terrorism in the Horn of Africa. Thereafter, we systematically examined the roles of regional and international actors in counter terrorism efforts in the region. It was learnt that there are several challenges facing countries in the region in combating terrorism, such as increasing Islamic radicalization, political dilemmas, and contending national interests. Also the CT efforts focuses on short term efforts like enhance the military strength while it ignores long-term strategy that ensure the rooting-out of the fundamental causes of terror. In addition, we learnt that while regional organizations (especially the AU and IGAD) are players in the area of CT in the HOA, they are faced with challenges some of which are poor political commitments of member states, lack of capacity of member states, and scarcity of organizational resources to effectively respond to and counter terrorism.

In the history of terror acts in the HOA, Kenya has been the chief primary target with the recent being the April 2015 Garissa University attack<sup>87</sup>. This chapter starts by capturing an overview of terrorism in Kenya. It carefully and briefly looks at trends, causes and drivers. Thereafter, in line with the second objective of this study, this chapter examines the effectiveness of CT strategies in Kenya. This is by examining state-centric and non-state-centric strategies. In doing this, it tries to find out if there is a cascade of similarities from that of HOA's CT strategies in the previous chapter with that of Nairobi.

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<sup>87</sup> BBC News. Kenya attack: 147 dead in Garissa University assault - (2016). Retrieved 9 September 2016, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32169080>

### 3.1 Terrorism in Kenya

Kenya has been a primary target and has faced a continuing terrorist threat from Al-Shabaab, the chief terror threat in the HOA for several reasons. This is because, of several geographic, historical, regional, political, economic and socio-cultural factors which include Islamic radicalization in the region; Kenya's vibrant coastal beach tourism industry that threatens domestic Islamic culture; poor socio-economic condition in the country (45 percent live below poverty line<sup>88</sup>); historical marginalization of the country's Muslim minority; Kenya's geographical proximity to Somalia where Al-Shabaab is headquartered & the Middle East; unstable neighbors (Sudan and Somalia); porous borders between Kenya and Somalia; as well as Kenya's strong historical ties with the West and Israel.<sup>89</sup> In line with the latter, most terror acts in Kenya have been against Western targets in the country.

In response to many terror attacks, the KDF have had success in its counter military operations in 2011 invasion in Somalia. However, those successes are short-lived as there are continued terror attacks after periodic short cessation of hostile attacks. This is attributed to the ever growing risks of home-grown terror, violent extremism and radicalization. Few terror attacks against Kenya and before the 2002 Paradise hotel bombing have been mentioned in the previous chapter. Thereafter, and since late 2011, Kenya has passed through many terror attacks.<sup>90</sup>

It started with the Monday, 24 October 2011 small-scale terror attack on a blue-collar bar known as Mwaura's in Mfangano Street in Nairobi.<sup>91</sup> The hurled grenade left one person dead while wounding more than 20. The Kenyan police

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<sup>88</sup> World Bank 2010

<sup>89</sup> Cannon, B.J., (2016). Terrorists, Geopolitics and Kenya's Proposed Border Wall with Somalia. *Journal of Terrorism Research*. 7(2), pp.23–37. DOI: <http://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.1235>

<sup>90</sup> Daily Nation., *How KDF's Somalia incursion changed Kenya*. (2016). Retrieved 9 September 2016, from <http://www.nation.co.ke/newsplex/newsplex-Linda-Nchi-Terrorism/2718262-2917062-9fm054/index.html>

<sup>91</sup> Jason Strazius, Tom Odula, Associated Press, "2 blasts in Nairobi amid fears of terrorist reprisal," Hearst Communications Inc., 25 October 2011.

reported that the weapon used was a Russian-made F1 grenade.<sup>92</sup> Later on the same day, a second blast happened, when a grenade was thrown into a bus terminal from a moving vehicle.<sup>93</sup> About 69 people were subsequently hospitalized, of which five people were confirmed dead<sup>94</sup>. This came after the US issued a potential threat of attack which stated that there are risks of reprisal actions by the Al-Shabaab due to the KDF operations in Somalia in the previous months and especially the October operations.<sup>95</sup> In November of the same year, there was an attack on Holiday Inn Hotel, the East African Pentecostal Church, a military convoy and several other attacks. There were around nine other attacks in Kenya, in December.<sup>96</sup>

On 21 September 2013 was the Westgate Shopping Mall terror attack in which unidentified gunmen attacked the upscale mall in Nairobi.<sup>97</sup> The attack resulted in around 67 deaths, and dozens of people were reportedly wounded in the mass shooting. Another major attack was in 2014, known as Mpeketoni attacks<sup>98</sup>. They happened between 15 and 17 June, and more than 60 people were killed in attacks in and close to Mpeketoni, Lamu County.<sup>99</sup> The attacks stated when about 50 masked gunmen hijacked a van<sup>100</sup><sup>101</sup> and raided a police station in the predominantly Christian

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<sup>92</sup> Associated Press, "Two grenade blasts rattle Nairobi; 1 dead", 24 October 2011. Retrieved on 24 June 2016, from <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2011-10-24/kenya-grenade-attack/50898570/1>

<sup>93</sup> David, Clarke, "A grenade attack at a bus station in central Nairobi killed five people and wounded 69, the Kenya Red Cross said on Sunday," Reuters, 11 March 2012. Retrieved on 24 June 2016, from <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/11/us-kenya-blast-idUSBRE82A03W20120311>

<sup>94</sup> Ibid

<sup>95</sup> CBC News, "Deadly grenade blasts rattle Nairobi", 24 October 2011. Retrieved on 24 June 2016, from

<http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2011/10/24/kenya-blast.html>

<sup>96</sup> Macharia, James., "Bombings threaten Kenya growth goals, open new strains with wary West," Reuters, 1 June 2014. Retrieved on 24 June 2016 from <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/06/01/uk-kenya-security-tourism-idUKKBN0EC1D720140601>

<sup>97</sup> Associated Press; Daniel, Douglass K., "39 people killed in Kenya mall attack claimed by Somali militants; hostages still held", The Washington Post, 21 September 2013, p. 2

<sup>98</sup> Daily Nation, "Mpeketoni attack: Death toll rises to 48", AFP, 16 June 2014.

Retrieved on 24 June 2016, from <http://www.nation.co.ke/news/mpeketoni-Lamu-gunfire-al-shabaab-terrorism/-/1056/2349860/-/yf5qvqgz/-/index.html>

<sup>99</sup> Ibid

<sup>100</sup> Gander, Kashmira, "Kenya hotel attack: Suspected al-Shabaab militants kill 48 people in Mpeketoni," The Independent, 16 June 2014. Retrieved on 24 June 2016, from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/kenya-hotel-attack-suspected-alshabaab-militants-kill-48-people-in-mpeketoni-9539402.html>

<sup>101</sup> Daily Nation, "Mpeketoni attack: Death toll rises to 48", AFP, 16 June 2014.

Retrieved on 24 June 2016, from <http://www.nation.co.ke/news/mpeketoni-Lamu-gunfire-al-shabaab-terrorism/-/1056/2349860/-/yf5qvqgz/-/index.html>

town,<sup>102</sup> as well as burning hotels, restaurants, and government offices. Around 53 people were reportedly killed during the attack, and eight others were unaccounted for as of 18 June.<sup>103104</sup>

In April 2015, gunmen stormed the Garissa University College, and killed almost 150 people while wounding several others. This was notwithstanding intelligence warnings that an attack was planned.<sup>105</sup> The attackers claimed to be from the Al-Shabaab militant group, and indicated that they were carrying out retaliation over non-Muslims occupying Muslim territory.<sup>106</sup> Several students were taken hostage, Muslims were free but Christians were withheld. Over 500 students were still unaccounted for.<sup>107</sup> Between 2012 and 2015, there were other lesser attacks, which include the 30 September 2012 attack at the Sunday school of St Polycarp's church in Nairobi;<sup>108</sup> 14 December 2013 Nairobi bus attack; 1 April 2014 Eastleigh attack; 23 April 2014 Nairobi police station bombing;<sup>109</sup> 4 May 2014 Nairobi bus bombings on the Thika Highway in Nairobi;<sup>110</sup> 16 May 2014 Gikomba bombings;<sup>111</sup> 26 May 2015 Garissa ambush and dozens of more.

In most of these attacks, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility, carried most of the attacks themselves or through radicalized Kenyan youths that could be considered as Al-Shabaab sympathizers. In line with the latter, in 2014, estimates suggested that

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<sup>102</sup> Reuters, "Unidentified gunmen hit hotels, petrol, police station at Kenya's coast: police", 16 June 2014. Retrieved on 24 June 2016, from <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/15/uk-kenya-attacks-idUSKBN0EQ15120140615>

<sup>103</sup> Daily Mail, "Al Shabaab gunmen kill 15 in overnight raid on Kenyan coastal villages just 24 hours after killing 50 in nearby Mpeketoni", 17 June 2014. Retrieved on 24 June 2016, from <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2659903/BREAKING-NEWS-Al-Shabaab-gunmen-kill-eight-night-raid-Kenyan-coastal-town-Poromoko-24-hours-killing-50-nearby-Mpeketoni.html>

<sup>104</sup> BBC News, "Kenya attacks: Al-Shabab raid village near Mpeketoni," 17 June 2014. Retrieved on 24 June 2016, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27882084>

<sup>105</sup> TSG IntelBrief, "Terrorism in the Horn of Africa", July 28, 2015.

<sup>106</sup> FoxNews, "Nearly 150 dead in Al-Shabaab school attack, Kenyan officials say". Retrieved on 24 June 2016, from <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/04/02/garissa-attack-kenya/>

<sup>107</sup> BBC News, "Kenya attack: Garissa University assault 'killed 147'", 2 April 2015.

Retrieved on 24 June 2016, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32169080>

<sup>108</sup> BBC News, "Kenya children hurt in church grenade attack", 30 September 2012 Retrieved on 24 June 2016, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-19776747>

<sup>109</sup> BBC News, "Kenya car bomb kills four in Nairobi's Pangani quarter", 23 April 2014 Retrieved on 24 June 2016, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27134695>

<sup>110</sup> BBC News, "Kenya buses hit by deadly twin blasts in Nairobi", 4 May 2014 Retrieved on 24 June 2016, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27277811>

<sup>111</sup> BBC News, "Kenya's Nairobi hit by twin blasts in Gikomba Market", 16 May 2014. Retrieved on 24 June 2016, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27443474>



about 25% of the total contributing forces of Al-Shabaab are Kenyans<sup>112</sup> which are preferably called "Kenyan Mujahideen".<sup>113</sup> Most of these radicalized Kenyans are typically overenthusiastic poor and young individuals that were specifically targeted by the cells of Al-Shabaab for recruitment. It's been harder for Kenyan security forces to track the terror or those radicalized Kenyans due to the facial and cultural dissimilarities between the Kenyan Mujahideens and the rest 75% fighter forces of Al-Shabaab; Thus an advantage for the Kenyan Mujahideens to fully blend into the larger population of Kenya with little or limited trace and detection. The Coastal areas of the HOA –like the coast in Zanzibar and Mombasa are largely populated by Muslims –are susceptible to radicalization, terror recruitment and terror safe havens.<sup>114</sup>

Al-Shabaab further termed these attacks, reprisals for the Kenyan military's deployment in the group's home country of Somalia through Operation Linda Nchi. The Operation was a coordinated military mission between the Somali and Kenyan militaries that began in October 2011, when troops from Kenya crossed the border into the conflict zones of southern Somalia. The Operation triggered many of these incessant attacks. By May 2014, the US, UK, and other Western countries issued a high security warning on their citizens residing or travelling to Kenya,<sup>115</sup> and this ultimately affected the tourism sector in Kenya. The tourism sector is the largest earner of foreign exchange to the country and the exit of foreign visitors leads to reduced hotel and transport operations which in-turn results to labour or staff cut-down.<sup>116</sup> This trends affect not only the tourism sector but also extends to the foreign missions in Kenya as some have been forced to reduce their presence in Kenya to only

<sup>112</sup> BBC News, "Funding jihad: Al-Shabab cash lures in young Kenyans", 11 December 2014. Retrieved on 24 June 2016, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30419987?print=true>

<sup>113</sup> Reuters, "Special Report: In Africa, a militant group's growing appeal", 30 May 2012. Retrieved on 24 June 2016, from <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-shabaab-east-africa-idUSBRE84T0NI20120530>

<sup>114</sup> Ibid

<sup>115</sup> NPR Parallel (2016). *Npr.org*. Retrieved 9 September 2016, from <http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/06/10/320335669/western-countries-issue-warnings-kenyan-tourism-gets-pummeled>

<sup>116</sup> Macharia, James., "Bombings threaten Kenya growth goals, open new strains with wary West," Reuters, 1 June 2014. Retrieved on 24 June 2016, from <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/06/01/uk-kenya-security-tourism-idUKKBN0EC1D720140601>

one city usually Nairobi as observed by the move by UK to close down the Mombasa Consulate<sup>117</sup>; also the U.S has reduced its staff strength in the bid to ensure adequate protection of all its staff after the death of many of its staff in the 1998 bombing<sup>118</sup>.

### **3.2 Examination of Kenya's CT Strategies**

Having gone through a brief overview of some of the recent and incessant terror attacks that Kenya has been through, since 2011; in this section, we carefully look at strategies used by the country to counter terrorism.<sup>119</sup> Since 2003 that the Kenyan government created the Anti-Terror Police Unit, the government has been focusing increased attention on preventing the migration of foreign fighters, including Kenyan nationals, to join Al-Shabaab in neighboring Somalia, as well as on Kenyan national foreign fighters returning from abroad. In regional and international CT mechanisms and programs, Kenya has been a strategic member of and has participated in IGAD's ICPAT, US' CJTF-HOA; and several AU and UN's CT conventions, action plans and protocols.

#### **3.2.1 National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC)**

After the several attacks by Al-Shabaab militants against and inside Kenya, the Kenyan government realized that terrorism is a cross-border crime and a national security threat. This necessitated the formation of a multi-agency mechanism, effective coordination of key actors and a coordinating mechanism as national CT focal point.<sup>120</sup> A CT strategy paper was conceived in April 2003 and presented to the Kenyan Cabinet which approved it in September 2003. As a result, NCTC was established and inaugurated on the 27<sup>th</sup> of January 2004. The NCTC defines itself as a

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<sup>117</sup> Capital News., "UK closes Mombasa Consulate over security fears", 13 June 2014. Retrieved on 24 June 2016, from <http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2014/06/uk-closes-mombasa-consulate-over-security-fears/>

<sup>118</sup> The Guardian., "US to cut Kenya embassy staff as threat of 'sophisticated' attacks grows", AFP, 17 May 2014. Retrieved on 24 June 2016, from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/17/kenya-nairobi-bomb-us-embassy-security>

<sup>119</sup> Lauren, Ploch., *Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The U. S. Response* (DIANE Publishing, 2011)

<sup>120</sup> National Counter Terrorism Center's website, at <http://counterterrorism.go.ke/aboutus.html>

policy institution established to serve primarily as the coordinating agency for all CT efforts for the GoK. It advises the National Security Advisory Committee (NSAC), public and private institutions on threat posed by terrorism to the country and provide advice to both public and private institutions.<sup>121</sup>

It has the mandate of: coordinating national CT efforts so as to detect, deter and disrupt terror acts; establish a database to assist law enforcement agencies; conduct public awareness on terrorism prevention; develop counter-radicalization strategies etc. The center established a Prevention Center to counter radicalization and violent extremism forming part of Kenya's comprehensive CT strategy which is anchored on the Prevent pillar and aimed at taking a softer approach to prevent terrorism.<sup>122</sup>

### **3.2.2 Operation Linda Nchi**

Operation Linda Nchi is the codename for a coordinated military operation between the Kenyan and Somali militaries in Somalia. The operation lasted for 8 months from 16 October 2011 to 31 May 2012. The soldiers cracked down on Al-Shabaab militants that are alleged to have kidnapped several foreign tourists and aid workers in Kenya.<sup>123</sup> Through the operation, Al-Shabaab was weakened, and Kenyan forces were later integrated into AMISOM. Many Al-Shabaab' leaders were captured in the operation. More than 6,000 Kenyan security personnel, including police were involved in the operation, and despite few casualties on the Kenyan side, more than 700 Al-Shabaab militants were killed & 61 captured.<sup>124</sup> The operation was in partnership with IGAD, the AU, and the Ethiopian military.<sup>125</sup> During the operation,

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<sup>121</sup> Ibid

<sup>122</sup> Ibid

<sup>123</sup> Al Jazeera, "Kenyan troops pursue al-Shabab into Somalia in Operation Linda Nchi", 16 October 2011.

Retrieved on 24 June 2016, from <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/10/20111016115410991692.html>

<sup>124</sup> BBC News., "Kenyan troops 'kill 60 al-Shabab fighters' in Somalia", 7 January 2012 Retrieved on 24 June 2016, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-16455039>

<sup>125</sup> Maasho, Aaron., "Ethiopia plans military mission to Somalia", Uk.reuters.com, 25 November 2011.

the US Air Force also shared surveillance data with the Kenyan military and also assisted in the operation.<sup>126</sup>

### **3.2.3 AMISOM Participation**

Originated as IGASOM, the African Union Mission in Somalia is an active (since 2007), regional peacekeeping mission operated by the AU with the approval of the UN in Somalia. As part of its mandate, AMISOM supports Somalia's forces in their battle against Al-Shabaab militants. As at 2015, the troop strength was at 22,126 troops,<sup>127</sup> with Kenyan contributing around 4,000. The troops were able to carry out several offensives against Al-Shabaab, killing many of them including their leaders. In addition, the KDF and AMISOM were able to evict Al-Shabaab, from their stronghold in the central and southern portions of Somalia, especially the port city of Kisumayo and Mogadishu.<sup>128</sup> This helped to grossly reduce the Al-Shabaab's financial resources, as the group lost import and export revenue due to the capture of the Ports which was the main source of income.<sup>129</sup>

### **3.2.4 Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:**

In 2003, Kenya established an inter-ministerial task force which focused on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism. The task force was able to review existing legislation and recommend ways of formulating a national policy to shut down channels of financing of terrorism.<sup>130</sup> In the same year, the GoK invoked the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Co-ordination Act of 1990 to deregister an array of Muslim NGOs which were accused of having linkages with terrorist groups. These included the al-Muntada al-Islami, al-Haramain Islamic

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<sup>126</sup> Musau, Nzau, "Kenya: Somali Prime Minister Arrives to Explain Position", AllAfrica.com, 31 October 2011.

<sup>127</sup> See: United Nations Security Council Resolution 2182 (2014) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7286th meeting, on 24 October 2014; Paragraph 23 - at [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2182\(2014\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2182(2014))

<sup>128</sup> Godfrey Buluma, "Al-Shabaab: The Threat To Kenya And The Horn Of Africa," United States Army War College, 2014

<sup>129</sup> Ibid

<sup>130</sup> Peter Kagwanja, "Counter-terrorism in the Horn of Africa: New security frontiers, old strategies", Institute for Security Studies, African Security Review 15.3, 2006

Foundation, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, Wakalatul-Rahmah offices, the al-Ibrahim Foundation and the al-Najah Islamic Centre in northern Kenya.<sup>131</sup> The Kenyan High Court threw out petitions to reverse the decision while the GoK deported al-Haramain's Sudanese director, Sheikh Muawiya Hussein in January 2004.<sup>132</sup>

Down to 2012, Kenya passed the 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act to aid the Proceeds of Crime & Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2011, and the Prevention of Organized Crime Act of 2012.<sup>133</sup> The President of Kenya, signed into law, in December 2014, the 2014 Security Laws (Amendment) Act. The Security Laws of 2014 reformed 20 existing in a bid to enhancing the CT policy framework. Positive steps included the creation of a coordinated border control agency, criminalization aiding or support for terrorist training, strengthening the capacity of the NCTC.<sup>134</sup> Conversely, other provisions included infringement on human rights like freedom of speech and the rights of refugees. This has sparked controversy and garnered criticism that they violated Kenya's international obligations and constitutionally-guaranteed civil liberties.

In line with the security sector overhaul, in 2013, the GoK divided CT roles between the 3 arms of the National Police Service: the Kenya Police consisting of the civil police, the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit and the paramilitary General Services Unit; the Directorate of Criminal Investigation and the Administration Police; and the non-police agencies like the National Intelligence Service and the KDF. The functioning efficacy of this effort was jeopardized due to lack of intra and inter-police-institution coordination as well as the coordination in the military-institutions.

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<sup>131</sup> P Mayoyo, "Kenya Muslims say no to US school funds," East African, 23 February 2004.

<sup>132</sup> Peter Kagwanja, "Counter-terrorism in the Horn of Africa: New security frontiers, old strategies", Institute for Security Studies, African Security Review 15.3, 2006

<sup>133</sup> The US Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2014, Chapter 2. Country Reports: Africa Overview, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM. Retrieved on 21 June 2016 from <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239404.htm>

<sup>134</sup> Ibid

Other factors includes lack of adequate training, resources; delineation of command, politicization and corruption of the CT institutions.<sup>135</sup> While the government have made productive efforts in addressing those challenges, those effort have proved to be insufficient in areas of corruption, border control and security.

The lack of border security capacities and the insufficiency of national identification system have decreased the success rate of law enforcers' ability to detect and detain potential terrorists. Nevertheless, biographic and biometric screening, terrorist screening watch lists, and other mechanisms are in place at the main entry ports in the country.

There are numerous and uncountable terror attacks that have been responded to or thwarted in 2014 by the Kenya security operatives. The multi-scaled operations *Usalama Watch* conducted between April and May 2014 arrested thousands of potential suspects, primarily in the two main cities of Kenya.<sup>136</sup> But the operation was criticized due to its constituted element of abuse, corruption and human rights violations.

### **3.2.5 Countering the Financing of Terrorism**

Kenya is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. Kenya has made progress in implementing its anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism regime, and was, in 2014, delisted from the continued monitoring scheme of the FATF.<sup>137</sup> In December, the Kenyan NGO Coordination Board publicized the registration revocation of 510 NGOs for failing to provide requisite financial reporting; the board also highlighted the possible inclusion of 15 more NGOs on the

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<sup>135</sup> Ibid

<sup>136</sup> Ibid

<sup>137</sup> Ibid

suspicion of financing terror. However, many of those NGO have been delisted after compiling with the requirements of the Board.<sup>138</sup>

Kenya's Anti-Money Laundering operations have progressively become functional with increased monitoring, evaluation and reporting capacities. Conversely, processes have not been tremendously successful due to deficiencies in essential resources that include but not limited to electronic-Financial reporting system. The Central Bank of Kenya has created awareness on the need for citizens to use the legal financial sectors in their transactions and savings in order to ensure an effective and transparent regulatory financial institution in Kenya.

### **3.2.6 Regional and International Cooperation**

In 2003, Kenya ratified all the twelve international CT conventions and protocols and published the Suppression of Terrorism Bill on 30 April. Kenya as a member-state in AU, IGAD, COMESA and EAC, have contributed, to the respective regional blocs it belongs to, with its substantial troop presence through bilateral and multilateral arrangements in conflict affected nations of those blocs. In 2014, in Nairobi, the head-of-States meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the AU; and the regional summits of the EAC intelligence and police chiefs substantially focused on issues of CT. Also the country has helped other member States in hosting and facilitating military exercise, trainings and drills within and among the EAC's States law enforcement professionals.<sup>139</sup>

### **3.2.7 Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism**

In an effort to countering terror, Kenya has made an initiated step in 2014 to partner with non-governmental organizations like the CSOs civil society. This was significantly and officially championed in the 2014 National Conference on Security

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<sup>138</sup> Ibid

<sup>139</sup> GoK, Kenya Foreign Policy, November 2014, Retrieved 9 September 2016, from <http://www.mfa.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Kenya%20Foreign%20Policy.pdf>

and CVE where State and non-State actors were actively engaged in a participatory approach to formulate and adopt a Violent Extremism Advocacy and Accountability Charter.<sup>140</sup> Additionally, was the development of a comprehensive National Counter-Radicalization Strategy which tasks religious leaders on their significant role in reducing the communities' risk to violence extremism and terrorism since they can influence peace and tension with their schismatic rhetoric especially after terror attacks.

### **3.2.8 Partnership with the US**

Since the aftermath of September 11, 2001, Kenya has been among the significant partner of the U.S and its allies in Africa on the Global War on Terror. This effort includes but not limited to training, sales of equipment, logistical support and exchange of strategic information. Deeper cooperation between the two nation is seen in the presence of Kenya as one of the 6 nations engaged in the U.S lead Security Governance Initiative (SGI).<sup>141</sup>

Kenyan security officers participated in many U.S led or sponsored programs featuring areas of crisis response, investigations, and prosecutions. The Antiterrorism Assistance program conducted by the U.S department of states for the East Africa Joint Operations exercise lasted for about four weeks featuring areas of crisis response training series and other areas.<sup>142</sup>

The partnership efforts of Kenya with developed states have enhanced the security systems at the entry ports of Kenya. This is evident by the presence of Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System in the ports in Kenya. The law enforcers have continued to gain experience through regional and

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<sup>140</sup> Ibid

<sup>141</sup> United States Department of State., *Security Governance Initiative: 2015 Review*. (2016). Retrieved 9 September 2016, from <http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/2016/253906.htm>

<sup>142</sup> United States Department of States., *Bolstering East African Nations' Capacity To Counter Terrorism*. .DipNote. Retrieved 9 September 2016, from <http://blogs.state.gov/stories/2016/08/17/bolstering-east-african-nations-capacity-counter-terrorism>



international cooperation on territorial security and increase the state's CT capabilities.<sup>143</sup>

### **3.2.9 Diplomatic solutions**

As having unstable neighbors has been one of the factors facilitating terror acts in Kenya, Nairobi has used the search for peace in Somalia and Sudan as the main diplomatic thrust of its CT effort. Kenya has made effort to ensure diplomatic talks as a strategy to deal with conflicts for a long time as seen in the case of Sudan and Somalia. The Somali-talks 'initiated in Eldoret and ended in Nairobi' led to the recognition and institution of the TFG which enabled measurable peace to return in the country.<sup>144</sup> The Sudan's peace talks led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of Sudan, and South Sudan's independence. Although South Sudan later went into its own war, Kenya still played a great role through IGAD to resolve it. Kenya's strategy has been to stabilize Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia politically in order to transform them into good neighbors whose security will greatly enhance that of Kenya.<sup>145</sup>

### **3.2.10 CT Strategies driven by NSAs**

Some Kenyan Civil Society Organizations are actively working to counter terror and violent extremism in Kenya; this is aided largely by U.S-Kenya partnership and Kenya's partnership with other international entities.<sup>146</sup> Some of them are Muslim for Human Rights, Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims, and Kenya Community Support Center (KECOSCE) etc. One key thing about their strategies is that through several programs, they are addressing some of the root causes of terrorism which are often tied with poor socio-economic conditions of Kenyans, radicalization and violent

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<sup>143</sup> United States Department of State., Country Report on Terrorism 2015. Retrieved 9 September 2016, from <http://www.longwarjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/2016-State-Department-Country-Report-on-Terrorism.pdf>

<sup>144</sup> AMISOM., *Somali Peace Process* *Le processus de paix somalien* *Geedi socodka Nabadda Soomaaliya - AMISOM*. (2016). Retrieved 9 September 2016, from <http://amisom-au.org/about-somalia/somali-peace-process/>

<sup>145</sup> Sudan Tribune., *Plural news and views on Sudan*. (2016). Retrieved 9 September 2016, from <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?mot3042>

<sup>146</sup> Lauren, Ploch., *Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The U. S. Response* (DIANE Publishing, 2011)

extremism.<sup>147</sup> Most of them also have programs that counter the propaganda messages of extremists and terrorists. They have remained key actors in engaging the community to recognize, understand, and act towards the prevention and mitigation of terror. Additionally, the organizations have helped in increasing the awareness and level of vigilance on terror or potential terror threat at both the local and community levels. In addition, they organize forums related to countering terror in partnerships with government and donor partners. Some of these forums are for the public, law enforcers and other CSO leaders, to better educate them about CVE.<sup>148</sup> The CSOs also work with policing and justice institutions, and help to train many specifically on reporting of suspicious activities.<sup>149</sup>

KECOSCE<sup>150</sup> for example has programs that aim at enabling the Coast communities to counter the increasing radicalization within the coastal areas of Kenya; this is aided by enhancing the youth's terror-resilience ability. They also facilitate the organization of community groups and creation of continuous space for dialogue among the all members of the community from the law, justice or security enforcers to the rest members of the community.<sup>151</sup> Further awareness on the effectiveness and importance to engage all members of the community on the ills of radicalization have been at the core focus of KECOSCE. Enhancing skills to counter the violent ideology at family, schools and public spaces and promotion of partnership with security agencies, change conceptions and increase cooperation to stop terrorists from using coast as a fertile ground for their operations have been as important as ever. Finally, KECOSCE trains the youths on business skills and empower them; and created an

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<sup>147</sup> Public Radio International., *Muslim leaders are trying to change the way Kenya fights terrorism*. (2016). Retrieved 9 September 2016, from <http://www.pri.org/stories/2015-08-23/muslim-leaders-are-trying-change-way-kenya-fights-terrorism>

<sup>148</sup> Ahmed Hadji & Ndugwa Hassan, "Working Paper Series", Uganda Muslim Youth Development Forum, 1/2014.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid

<sup>150</sup> A Non-Governmental Organization based in the Coast Region of Kenya

<sup>151</sup> Ahmed Hadji & Ndugwa Hassan, "Working Paper Series", Uganda Muslim Youth Development Forum, 1/2014.

early warning and response mechanism to cushion sources of information, and monitor the activities of suspect groups and individuals.

### **3.3 Conclusion**

The findings of this chapter seems to suggests that Kenya's CT strategies and preparedness between 2002 and 2011 were grossly insufficient and ineffective since despite them, many small and large scale attacks occurred between 2011 and 2015 in the country. Even the formation of NCTC to formulate and implement CT strategies in 2004, did not do much to mitigate the 4-year incessant attacks. We also observed that corruption, organization inefficiency, lack of resources and technical capacity, poor interagency law enforcement coordination among, insufficient training, politicization of some terrorist incidents, and several other factors have affected Nairobi's capacity to sufficiently fight terrorism especially in line with its law enforcement.

Furthermore, from examining Nairobi's CT strategies in this chapter, there is a cascade of similarities from that of HOA's in the previous chapter. In the light of this, the findings show that according to the second hypothesis of this study, Nairobi has been focusing more on state-centric and militaristic strategies in the fight against terrorism. In addition, the Kenya Defense Forces have been on the fore front in the fight against Al-Shabaab and have achieved some successes. However, as long as the factors that cause and facilitate terrorism in Kenya, the country will probably continue to deal with terrorist attacks.

The findings of this chapter indicated that the objective two of this study i.e. examination of the effectiveness of counter terrorism mechanisms in Kenya, reveals that the sole militaristic approach of CT have to a greater extent proved inadequate in fighting terrorism and has precipitated increased terror attacks. This mechanism

hasnot succeeded due to failure to understand causes of terrorism and lack of CT mechanism that includes non-state actors.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **STRATEGIES FOR COUNTER TERRORISM IN KENYA AND THE HORN OF AFRICA**

#### **4.0 Introduction**

Although, Kenya looks determined to get rid of the terror threats for both security and economic reasons, a change in CT approach for an all-encompassing grand strategy is very imperative. This is because several factors which are identified in section 3.1 of chapter three as the causes and facilitators of terrorism in Kenya are still there and will remain there in years to come. Key amongst them and that should be systematically addressed are Islamic radicalization, violent extremism, poor socio-economic condition in the country that make the youths vulnerable to recruitment by terror organizations, unstable neighbors (Sudan and Somalia), and porous borders between Kenya and Somalia.

From the two previous chapters, we have learnt that most of the national, regional and international CT strategies in the HOA and Kenya are more of short-termed, state-centric and militaristic, with many of them failing to address the root causes of terrorism. To effectively deal with the menace on a long term basis, it's important to develop a grand strategy that involves less militaristic and preventive strategies; includes all relevant stakeholders such as NSAs; encourages harmonization of strategies between state and non-state actors; and addresses the roots causes of terrorism.

In line with the third objective of this study, this chapter accesses the effectiveness CT mechanisms in Kenya and provides a framework for a grand strategy that will encompass CT strategies by government of Kenya, NGOs, religious communities, affected communities, families of victims, private sector, media and

rehabilitated victims. In addition, we identify a grand strategy for the HOA which involves mechanisms that are products of a comprehensive examination of the causes of terrorism into the region.

#### **4.1.0 Kenya and NSAs – roles and collaborations in CT**

The most important element of the grand strategy are partnerships and harmonization of strategies between Kenya and NSAs such as the private sector, NGOs, the media, and religious communities, in order to effectively address the root causes of terrorism, such as Islamic radicalization, violent extremism, and poor socio-economic condition.

##### **4.1.1 The role of the private sector in countering terrorism**

The private sector can act as a resource or catalyst to terror likewise as it has the potential to be resourceful in countering terror.<sup>152</sup> It has been observed that the private sector financial institutions<sup>153</sup> and innovations in technology<sup>154</sup> often aid the operations of the extremists. However, it has also been observed that terrorism affects the private sector in many ways such as asset losses & increased costs of doing business. This sets the stage for private sector contribution to countering terrorism through: cooperation with security agencies in technological innovations to strengthen capabilities of the security agencies; cooperation with relevant government agencies in stemming financial flows to extremists; and resource mobilization for corporate social responsibility programs that benefit communities that are affected or at risk to radicalization.<sup>155</sup>

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<sup>152</sup> Neal, S., Business as Usual? Leveraging the Private Sector to Combat Terrorism. *Perspectives On Terrorism*, 2(3). (2010). Retrieved from <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/31/html>

<sup>153</sup> Business-standard., *Kenya cracks down on financial firms over terror links*. (2016). Retrieved 14 September 2016, from [http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/kenya-cracks-down-on-financial-firms-over-terror-links-115040800973\\_1.html](http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/kenya-cracks-down-on-financial-firms-over-terror-links-115040800973_1.html)

<sup>154</sup> The Christian Science Monitor., *New encryption technology is aiding terrorists, intelligence director says*. (2016). Retrieved 14 September 2016, from [http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/monitor\\_breakfast/2016/0425/New-encryption-technology-is-aiding-terrorists-intelligence-director-says](http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/monitor_breakfast/2016/0425/New-encryption-technology-is-aiding-terrorists-intelligence-director-says)

<sup>155</sup> Regional Conference On Countering Violent Extremism, "Outcome Document - Deepening Cooperation in Countering Violent Extremism," Kenyatta International Conference Centre, Nairobi, Kenya, 25 to 28 June 2015

After the increased terror attacks since 2011, private security firms have joined government security agencies in ensuring the safety of Kenyans and their properties. Those private security counter-terrorists have aided in information sharing, surveillance, security and property protections which all works towards the support of national security. This is evident in the technical and highly coordinated security check through private policing at the entrance of most buildings of cooperate and business institutions. Also the prevalence of private policing in the cities and urban hubs of Kenya far outnumbers the public policing.

In April 2015, after the Gairssa University attack, the Government of Kenya published list of private organisations considered to have aided terrorist financially.<sup>156</sup>In the wake of this list, most of those organizations have complied with the financial regulations of Kenya and subsequently delisted.

Research entities like private institutes and private universities in Kenya have engaged in cutting edge research targeted on terrorism related areas. Those researches are usually policy directed and valuable to lawmakers and enforcers.

#### **4.1.2 The role of NGOs in countering terrorism**

There is an immense value of close collaboration between NGOs and the government of Kenya. This is based on the fact that those NGOs possess vital knowledge that helps in promoting community and family centered measures that can equip the basic units of social organization to be at the forefront of CT.<sup>157</sup>NGOs have the potential to advocate against mass indoctrination and mobilization tools used by extremists.<sup>158</sup>The government of Kenya has the opportunity to prioritize on supporting NGOs to guarantee and boost effective local CT operations. Government-NGO partnership on

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<sup>156</sup> Business-standard *Kenya cracks down on financial firms over terror links*. (2016). Retrieved 14 September 2016, from [http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/kenya-cracks-down-on-financial-firms-over-terror-links-115040800973\\_1.html](http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/kenya-cracks-down-on-financial-firms-over-terror-links-115040800973_1.html)

<sup>157</sup> OSCE ODIHR., *The Role of Civil Society in Preventing Terrorism*, Informal Working Level Meeting, 14-16 March 2007, Barcelona, Spain, Report, ODIHR.GAL/34/07, 16 May 2007, Retrieved 14 September 2016, from [http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2007/05/24495\\_en.pdf](http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2007/05/24495_en.pdf)

<sup>158</sup> Ibid

de-radicalization create safe “points-of-contact” for concerned family members, friends and neighbors of radicalized individuals.<sup>159</sup>

The NGOs in Kenya have helped in addressing economic and social issues that are considered as vital element of the root causes of terrorism, those mainstream civil societies engage in service deliveries aided by the funds they receive from the Kenyan government and donors.<sup>160</sup> Those NGOs have also been critical in check-mating the CT operations of the government towards ensuring the rights and safety of the populace. Additionally the health oriented NGOs are of significant importance to health emergency response and recovery process in the aftermath of terror or counterterror incidences.

An example of active NGOs in CT in the HOA includes but not limited to: Africa Peace Advocate which works with communities in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Djibouti to counter radicalization and extremism messages; Peace League Africa which works with communities in Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea; Uganda Muslim Youth Development Forum (UMYDF) which works on extensive programs that engage in de-radicalization, counter violent extremists messages, enhancing religious literacy that advocate for peace, combat and counter violent extremism; Kenya Community Support Center (KECOSCE) in the coastal region of Kenya; and Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM).<sup>161</sup>

Kenya Community Support Center (KECOSCE), an NGO established in 2006 has broadly engaged in actions that strengthens the community’s resilience to terrorism. Specifically, the center have helped in identifying radicalized youths and those at the risk of been radicalized or recruited; engaged in dependable psychological

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<sup>159</sup> Regional Conference On Countering Violent Extremism, "Outcome Document - Deepening Cooperation in Countering Violent Extremism," Kenyatta International Conference Centre, Nairobi, Kenya, 25 to 28 June 2015

<sup>160</sup> Lind, J. and Howell, J., Counter-terrorism and the Politics of Aid: Civil Society Responses in Kenya. *Development and Change*, 41: 335–353. (Hague, 2010) doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7660.2010.01637.x

<sup>161</sup> Ahmed, Hadji., Ndugwa, Hassan., The Role of CSOs in Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) - A Case of actors in East African Region. (Umydf, 2016) Retrieved 15 September 2016, from <http://umydf.org/downloads/Role%20of%20CSOs.pdf>



and community support, and mentoring; involved in tracking and reporting online media content considered to be abhorrent, de-radicalization seminars and radicalization awareness forums; and systematic engagements with significant religious frontrunners.<sup>162</sup> KECOSCE partners with other civil society organization and also a member of Kenya Peace Network. KECOSCE engages in televised and radio programmes on radicalization awareness and public sensitization on peace.<sup>163</sup>

Additionally, KECOSCE provides livelihood support to unemployed and underemployed youths through education, training, and internship/apprenticeship. KECOSCE liaises with community policing mechanisms to enhance human security at local level and advocate for effective governance at the local level. The advocacy ensures delivery of basic services, including mapping and reporting of corrupt practices.

The Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) was founded in 1973 to address the challenges of Muslim and provide viable platform for economic and social support. SUPKEM have engaged in advocacy and sensitization programs, and economic empowerment through partnership with relevant government agencies, donors and the community. SUPKEM have over the years strongly urged the Muslim community to ensure they are educated through the formal institutions in order not to be challenged knowledge-wise. SUPKEM has continually engaged in building networks with appropriate establishments, organizations and agencies at different levels of governance in the society; and also strategically sharing of intelligent information with other reliable stakeholder<sup>164</sup>. In an effort of CT, SUPKEM assumes

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<sup>162</sup> Marshall Center., PTSS 16-12 Participants Study Civil Society's Role in Defeating Terrorism, Counter Terror Financing. (2016). Retrieved 14 September 2016, from <http://www.marshallcenter.org/MCPUBLICWEB/de/nav-main-more-employment-de/62-cat-english-en/cat-gcmc-pao-en/cat-gcmc-pao-news-en/2028-ar-news-2-25-jul-16-en.html>

<sup>163</sup> Kenya Community Support Centre., Kecosce Annual Report - 2013 - (KECOSCE, 2013). Retrieved 14 September 2016, from [http://www.kecosce.org/downloads/kecosce\\_organizational\\_annual\\_report\\_2013.pdf](http://www.kecosce.org/downloads/kecosce_organizational_annual_report_2013.pdf)

<sup>164</sup> Arcworld., Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims Strategic Plan and Transition from MDGS TO SDGS. (2015) Retrieved 15 September 2016, from <http://www.arcworld.org/downloads/SUPKEM.pdf>

the role of pioneering the national Advocacy and Accountability Charter on countering violent extremism<sup>165</sup>.

SUPKEM helps in training religious leaders on counter-narratives of radicalized and violent extremist's messages. Also it shares strategic information with local-higher learning institutions and additionally encourages inter-faith peaceful co-existence.

Despite the efforts of Government-NGO partnership in Kenya, the country still faces challenge of harmonization of those partnerships with various NGOs involved in CT, and in addition the monitoring and evaluation of programmes set by those NGOs.

#### **4.1.3 The role of the media and internet in countering terrorism**

Evidently as observed through research and reality, the social media and internet is open to mainstream society and extremists<sup>166</sup>. Terrorism has been modified in the modern day, partly due to the advent of technological innovation in the media sector and the increasing international influence it commands<sup>167</sup>.

Extremists largely recruit from the social media. In the light of this, it is key that the role of the media and internet is enhanced in effective CT, through exploring good practices in the use of internet, related technology and the media in CT. The need for the government of Kenya, media agencies and other relevant actors to partner in an effort to reduce the availability of media tools to extremist groups; monitoring the abuse and the use of the social media and internet for mobilization and recruitment has been significant as it is in this present day.<sup>168</sup>

More often, the media have been blamed for acting as a catalyst of terror. This is because of the psychological effect of traumatic terror incident reports and the

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<sup>165</sup> International Center for Counterterrorism., National Workshop on Countering Incitement and Violent Extremism in Kenya | ICCT. (2014). Ict.nl. Retrieved 15 September 2016, from <https://icct.nl/update/icct-works-with-un-cted-on-counter-terrorism-in-nairobi/>

<sup>166</sup> Cha, V. D., "Globalization and the Study of International Security," *Journal of Peace Research*, 37(3), (2000)

<sup>167</sup> Cronin, A. K., "Behind the Curve, Globalization and International Terrorism," *International Security*, 27(3), (2003)

<sup>168</sup> Regional Conference On Countering Violent Extremism, "Outcome Document - Deepening Cooperation in Countering Violent Extremism," Kenyatta International Conference Centre, Nairobi, Kenya, 25 to 28 June 2015

strategic neglect of reporting the ideological command of terrorist.<sup>169</sup> And as such, the media is considered as the terrorist's best friend<sup>170</sup>. Evidently, the coverage of the Westgate attack live on twitter social media and on TV stations nationally and internationally helped the terrorist to gain psychological momentum, and spread fear and propaganda.

The power of media in CT has never been significantly demonstrated like the role of media before and after the 9/11 attack.<sup>171</sup> Likewise the government of Kenya has strategically used traditional media to deflate the perverted narratives by extremists and solidify the correct messaging that promotes the values of universalism, plurality, democracy, tolerance and freedom as the basis of a common humanity.

#### **4.2.0 The military and CT in Kenya**

Since 9/11, the western countries and especially the US and UK, has taken strategic steps to help Kenya and other countries in the HOA in the fight against terror. They have supported the various successive governments in the HOA in terms of military training, armaments, and other logistical supports. Since the formation of AMISON which has Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, and Ethiopia military helping to enforce and keep peace in Somalia against Al-Shabab and other terror affiliates.

The EU has been helping in training and arming the Somali national army to help sustain the Somali transitional government. Kenya had earlier intervened in Somalia in 2011, after the terrorist attacked vital installations, kidnapping tourists and aid workers. Kenya sought to protect her vital economic, security and national

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<sup>169</sup> Peter Orengo, "Tears as blast victims commemorate 1998 bombing," East African Standard, August 7th 2011.

<sup>170</sup> Walter, Laqueur., *The Age of Terrorism: The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction*. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987)

<sup>171</sup> Nacos, Brigitte L. and Oscar Torres-Reyna. 2002. "Muslim Americans in the News before and after 9-11." Prepared for presentation at the Symposium "Restless Searchlight: Terrorism, the Media & Public Life," co-sponsored by the APSAC Communication Section and the Shorenstein Center at the John F. Kennedy School, Harvard University.

interest. This has over the year resulted into a backlash through increased attacks on the Kenyan soil by the terrorist.<sup>172</sup>

The government of Kenya has established several agencies to militaristically counterterror, this includes but not limited to National Security Intelligence Service, Anti-Terrorism Police Unit, Joint Terrorism Task Force, National Counter-Terrorism Center, and the National Security Advisory Committee.<sup>173</sup>

In an all-encompassing military strategy, those established agencies have integrated maximum harmonization among themselves in order to deter and counter terror attacks ahead of time. A few of those military measures includes: increased deployment of security personnel in terror prone areas; building of perimeter security wall and strengthened border patrol at the Kenya-Somali border to bolt the terrorists; establishment of the 'Nyumba Kumi initiative' that enables Kenyans to know their neighbor and report any suspicious fellow and activities; and increased military budget to aid effective operations.<sup>174</sup>

#### **4.3.0 Multilateral Grand Strategy of CT in the Kenya and the HOA**

After the 9/11 attack, the Government of Kenya affirms through the UN resolution 1373 to support intensified and comprehensive global collaboration in the fight against terror.<sup>175</sup> State has also signed and ratified regional and international treaties and conventions related to counterterrorism. Furthermore the State has continually

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<sup>172</sup> Mohochi, S. 'Preventive Counter Terrorism Action': Case Study of Kenya. Electronic Journal. Retrieved 16 September 2016, from [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228214415\\_'Preventive\\_Counter\\_Terrorism\\_Action'\\_Case\\_Study\\_of\\_Kenya](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228214415_'Preventive_Counter_Terrorism_Action'_Case_Study_of_Kenya)

<sup>173</sup> Ibid

<sup>174</sup> Strategic Intelligence Service., Kenya Government Counter-Terrorism Measures Against Al Shabaab Islamists. (2016). Retrieved 16 September 2016, from <http://intelligencebriefs.com/kenya-government-counter-terrorism-measures-against-al-shabaab-islamists/>

<sup>175</sup> UN Security Council, Letter dated 2002/09/29 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning Counter-terrorism addressed to the President of the Security Council, 31st July 2002, S/2002/856, Retrieved 16 September 2016, from <http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/517/02/IMG/N0251702.pdf?OpenElement>

engaged in the adoption and usage of legislative measures that ensures the compliance of the CT strategies with the instruments of the UN.<sup>176</sup>

Kenya has benefited immensely through international cooperation in the fight against terror. Kenya is one of the largest recipients of US assistance in the Sub-Saharan Africa. Over 141 USD million have been received since 2010 and most of which were directed to military training and procurement to weapons. There have been efforts to stabilize Somalia to enable her join the East African Community.

There have been a number of challenges in this fight against terror: lack of prioritization of donors; competing interest of regional armies especially Kenya and Ethiopia; corruption and immigration problems; increasing influx of refugees in Kenya, some of whom are sympathizers and loyalists of terrorists. Kenya has reaffirmed her effort through Somali relocation scheme, to help resettle a significant number of Somali refugees in Kenya back to Somalia. The large number of Somali youths in Kenya has also facilitated a breeding ground for radicalization.

#### **4.4.0 Conclusion**

This chapter affirms that terrorism cannot be defeated by solely militaristic approach rather a multidimensional approach that cut across state actors like the military, the Non-state actors like the civil societies (NGOs and CBOs, religious communities, the media, private sectors, affected communities, families of victims, and relevant research). Additionally, the multilateral and bilateral partners play an important role in CT.

The findings of this chapter reaffirms that objective three (3) i.e. generating appropriate and effective strategy of countering terrorism in Kenya and the horn of

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<sup>176</sup> Mohochi, S. 'Preventive Counter Terrorism Action': Case Study of Kenya. Electronic Journal. Retrieved 16 September 2016, from [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228214415\\_'Preventive\\_Counter\\_Terrorism\\_Action'\\_Case\\_Study\\_of\\_Kenya](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228214415_'Preventive_Counter_Terrorism_Action'_Case_Study_of_Kenya)

Africa, that the fight against terrorism must be multi-dimensional which involves all relevant stakeholders.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS.**

#### **5.0 Introduction**

This chapter presents and analyzes the data collected from the Kenya Anti-Terror Police Unit and Kenya Community Support Center KECOSCE.

#### **5.1 Drivers of terrorism in Kenya**

The drivers of terrorism in Kenya are many but can be specifically identified from the following factors: economic, political and social issues<sup>177</sup>. Those three issues are driven by unemployment, marginalization and historical injustices, extremism, ideology and regional factors<sup>178</sup>. The interviewee all jointly indicated that the influencers of terrorism in Kenya can be summed into: poor socio-economic conditions such as low income, unemployment, illiteracy and marginalization; bad governance; religious fundamentalism; and external factors such as joint war against terror, foreign military deployment and the influence of terrorist organizations abroad.

Those drivers and influencers of terror have not been politically addressed by the counterterror strategy put in-place.<sup>179</sup> One of the interviewee stated that devolution which was intended to end marginalization has brought to the fore further marginalization from within counties. Bad governance and corruption has further led to youth unemployment and bad management of resources increasing the propensity of factors pushing youth in to radicalization and violent extremism.<sup>180</sup>

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<sup>177</sup> Interviewee 1 with ATPU; Interviewee 3 with ATPU

<sup>178</sup> Interviewee 2 with ATPU; Interviewee 3 with ATPU

<sup>179</sup> Interviewee 1 with ATPU

<sup>180</sup> Interviewee 4 with KECOSCE

## **5.2 Counter terrorism mechanisms used in the horn of Africa**

Kenya's war on terrorism is much more structured around the military approach. The war in Somalia has brought terrorists from their hiding spots in the Country in to our doorsteps (West gate and other attacks). This is further worsened by the reduced preparedness to counter homegrown terrorism, and structure both soft and hard approaches of countering terrorism. The newly launched National strategy has attempted to bring coordination but with it comes the shrinking space for civil society operations. The government has shown resolve and initiative in fighting terrorism but the approaches employed need to be more structured, intensified and sustained.<sup>181</sup>

The CT mechanism in Kenya includes mainly the military and intelligence frameworks. It also includes the efforts of NSAs as seen in the de-radicalization efforts of the GoK and NSAs like UNDP, USAID and other Community Based Organizations.<sup>182</sup> The community has helped in giving the information to security officers, formation of nyumbakumi to help reduce crime and terror<sup>183</sup>. Influential community leaders within the community have strategically cooperated with CT agencies to counter the narratives of extremism and reduce radicalization<sup>184</sup>.

The National peace and security infrastructures anchors community policing in Kenya on the Nyumba Kumi Initiative which is a community owned and led initiative on vigilance and security approach. Though there have been some success on this strategy especially in rural set ups the strategy has experienced a lot of challenges and is yet to work properly in urban set ups partly because of the manner in which the strategy was operationalized (with insufficient/ lack of civic awareness and

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<sup>181</sup>Interviewee 4 with KECOSCE

<sup>182</sup>Interviewee 3 with ATPU

<sup>183</sup>Interviewee 2 with ATPU

<sup>184</sup>Interviewee 1 with ATPU



sensitization on the process). The Uwiano Platform and the 999 alert systems all rely on crowd sourcing from members of the public.<sup>185</sup>

The national strategy on countering violent extremism places civil society organizations at the heart of its implementation. The strategy has recognized CSOs efforts and donor agencies as contributing to its 9 pillars. The government has in place ad hoc measures in involving and engaging CSOs such as during regional and national forums on countering violent extremism, the ratification of international conventions on countering terrorism which factor in efforts of CSOs. And the enactment of laws such as the Counter terrorism Act of 2012, and the national security laws amendment act of 2014 which have recognized efforts of NGOS/CSOs.<sup>186</sup> However, there is reduced involvement of NGOs due to the government perceived fact that the NGOs cannot safeguard classified information and can easily be compromised or infiltrated by terror cells or units<sup>187</sup>.

The efforts of GoK in CT over the years has been aided by the establishment of the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), a coordination focal point for counter terrorism operations, including the operationalization of the National strategy on countering violent extremism; the support for international missions on the war against terrorism like the presence of Kenya in the African Mission in Somalia; the institutionalization of the Nyumba Kumi initiative/ strategy on community policing; the operational improvement of the Kenya Defense Forces and the Kenya Police with an improved equipment and infrastructure in preparedness for countering terror acts; and operationalized partnership agreements with other countries and entities like the IGAD, American Mission in the Horn of Africa, and other Diplomatic missions) on

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<sup>185</sup>Interviewee 4 with KECOSCE

<sup>186</sup>Interviewee 4 with KECOSCE

<sup>187</sup>Interviewee 2 with ATPU

training and capacity building of Law enforcement agencies in fighting and preventing terrorism.<sup>188</sup>

### **5.3 Effectiveness of counter terrorism mechanisms in Kenya**

The GoK CT is characterized heavy use of the military, less consideration for human right, limited elements of democratic governance and consequently resulting to a relatively less effective approach to counter terror. The militaristic approaches have been seen to be very effective in limiting terror in short-term but relatively failed to stop the resurgence of terror activities.

The GoK strategy have made efforts on youth empowerment programmes like training and employment, political will and formation of specialized agency e.g. antiterrorism police and the national counter terrorism center, engagement of religious leaders to come up with counter narratives of the terror/extremists e.g. SUPKEM's involvement, and regional and international cooperation. However, this mechanism has not been sufficient enough to be effective. The reduced effectiveness of this mechanism is that it does not address the drivers and influencers of terrorism. The mechanism fails to explicitly socio-economic issues, bad governance, religious fundamentalism, and external factors.<sup>189</sup>

Social economic challenges and drivers to violent extremism, strategies such as the National Youth Service have been abused with grand corruption schemes and have reduced community participation in the project. Such efforts have not been able to match the demands of the youth bulge.<sup>190</sup>

There is no political good will in implementing programs targeted at improving governance ; devolution as foreseen by the Constitution of Kenya 2010, Was to bring resources and decision making (amongst other functions) closer to the

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<sup>188</sup>Interviewee 4 with KECOSCE

<sup>189</sup>Interviewee 2 with ATPU; Interviewee 3 with ATPU

<sup>190</sup>Interviewee 4 with KECOSCE

people, this has been marked with grand corruption in the public and further plunged minorities and communities opposing incumbent local in to marginalization from within. The principle on checks and balances has not been able to be executed as envisaged and has been countered by the euphoria on Tyranny of numbers in both legislative assemblies that have ratified practices that have led to bad governance both at County and National levels of governance.<sup>191</sup>

The setting up of the new Religious societies Rules by the attorney general was an attempt to cushion the public from religious fundamentalist and firebrand teachings though it was widely contested. The National CVE strategy has put in place a pillar on how government shall deal with the spread of ideologies through religion. It is noteworthy that the killings and disappearances of radical Muslim clerics at the Coast believed to be perpetrated by the government is counterproductive; efforts by the Ant Terrorist Unit of the police have also been opposed by the public and have been seen to make victims and their supporters to abhor government and sympathize with VEOs.<sup>192</sup>

#### **5.4 Strategies for counter terrorism in Kenya and the horn of Africa**

More needs to be done on the civilian approaches to CT, civic education and sensitization to reduce the appeal for youth recruitment in to VEOs, governance and distribution of resources/wealth needs to be rationalized to enhance their proper utilization in order to address push factors.<sup>193</sup>

The CT mechanism in Kenya still faces in Kenya inadequate human capital, mutating nature of terrorism, limited national coordination of information across all the security agencies at the various governance levels, challenge of information collection and analysis limited counter narrative of the extremist ideology. Less

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<sup>191</sup>Interviewee 4 with KECOSCE

<sup>192</sup>Interviewee 4 with KECOSCE

<sup>193</sup>Interviewee 4 with KECOSCE

inclusion of NGOs, religious communities, affected communities, families of victims, private sector, media and rehabilitated victims, in the GoK's CT strategies will help to combat terrorism.<sup>194</sup>

KECOSCE as an NSA are involved in comprehensive CT strategy conducted through: awareness on the impact of violent extremism, embracing national values and principles of governance, and available opportunities for the youth to engage in economic activities; inter and intra faith dialogues to demystify religious propaganda and ideologies led by prominent religious leaders, reaching out to the youth, women and minorities. Conduct mentorship programs in schools (both secondary and primary schools) to provide alternative narratives and inspire students to embrace values and enhance performance in schools; engagement forums between government law enforcement agencies and community leaders have been held; trained and supported community policing committees to improve policing and information sharing between public and the police.<sup>195</sup> The GoK strategy needs to harness the involvement of more NSAs in those strategies KECOSCE are engaged with.

## **5.4 Conclusion**

This finding of this chapter reveals that the drivers of terror are issues related to economics, social and political factors. The counterterror mechanism in Kenya is heavily militaristic with limited effort on the inclusion of NSAs, and thus the resulting to limited effectiveness of the Counterterror mechanism in Kenya. The success of a comprehensive CT strategy includes not only the military and intelligence approach but in addition, a softer and diplomatic approach that addresses the root cause of terrorism.

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<sup>194</sup>Interviewee 3 with ATPU; Interviewee 2 with ATPU

<sup>195</sup>Interviewee 4 with KECOSCE

## **CHAPTER SIX**

### **SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **6.0 Introduction**

This chapter gives detailed summary of counter terrorism mechanisms used in the horn of Africa, effectiveness of counter terrorism mechanisms in Kenya and the strategies for counter terrorism in Kenya and the horn of Africa. The chapter further outlines the conclusion of the study and recommendation of the study.

#### **6.1 Summary**

In the CT mechanism used in the HOA, the HOA is vulnerable to terror and have been militarily countered, and thus needs to importantly address the root causes of terror to strengthen the efficacy of counter-terrorism efforts. The study accepts the first hypothesis that the concentration on state-centric CT mechanisms which are often militaristic can be counter-productive. Grieve from militaristic CT operations lead to massive casualties, sympathizers of terrorist and further resulting to the threatened objective of CT. Regional commitment and cooperation within the HOA is crucial in order to win the fight against terror.

The effectiveness of CT mechanisms proved to have been ineffective due to the continued frequency of terror attack especially between 2011 and 2015. Despite institutional reforms to CT, there were observed corruption, organization inefficiency, lack of resources and technical capacity, poor interagency law enforcement coordination among, insufficient training, politicization of some terrorist incidents, and several other factors have affected the GOK's capacity to sufficiently fight terrorism especially in line with its law enforcement. The study accepts the second hypothesis that increased acts of terror have been consequences of the GoK's

institutions focusing only on militaristic strategies, ignoring non-militaristic options. Nairobi has been focusing more on state-centric and militaristic strategies in the fight against terrorism. Sole militaristic CT approach has to a greater extent proved inadequate in the fight against terror and has influenced an increased rise in terror.

The comprehensive strategy existent in Kenya lacks a multidimensional approach that involves State agencies and non-states like NGOs and CBOs, religious communities, the media, private sectors, affected communities, families of victims, and relevant research entities. The findings of this chapter reaffirms that objective three (3) i.e. generating appropriate and effective strategy of countering terrorism in Kenya and the horn of Africa, that the fight against terrorism must be multi-dimensional which involves all relevant stakeholders. The study accepts the third hypothesis that a combined effort by both the state and Non-state actors will succeed in fighting terrorism.

## **6.2 Conclusion**

This study identified the existing strategy for countering terrorism in Kenya and the HOA. Though the HOA's closeness to the Arabian Peninsula gives rise to the chances of HOA to be continually a passageway and safe-haven for al-Qaeda activities, the implementation of this grand strategy will help primarily to relegate Al-Shabaab to the background.

The CT strategy that Kenya uses to address terrorism have still not addressed preventive terrorism measures such as enhanced partnerships between government of Kenya and domestic NSAs to counter extremism and radicalization, and additionally other root causes of terror; the strategy lacks an effective combating of terrorism, limited effort of continued diplomatic solutions to restore stability in adjoining countries, and less progressive cooperation with external actors.

This grand strategy is by no means exhaustive, but can constitute substantial progress in CT in Kenya and the HOA if implemented collectively effectively. Failure to implement such a multifaceted strategy however, indeed poses significant detriment to Kenya's, regional and global security.

### **6.3.0 Recommendation**

The Study suggests a national CT and CVE plans; other effective CT strategy that includes elements of border managements, diplomatic arrangements, addressing marginalization of Muslims and equipping the security forces; and finally a grand strategy to countering terrorism in Kenya.

#### **6.3.1 National CT and CVE Plans**

Kenya and other relevant stakeholders should come up with National Counter Violent Extremism and Terrorism plans which should reflect a multiagency approach within government, NGOs, religious communities, communities and affected communities. Such would be geared towards community engagement, resilience and development. Such plans should be inclusive and holistic (encompassing hard and soft methods). There is also a need to reform religious education to incorporate comparative religion, and train clerics for the purposes of promoting authentic religious values. Islamic clerics should work with the government on countering religious radicalization and violent extremism of the Muslim youth the most likely targets for recruitment by terrorists and extremists.

There should be pathways to counter violent extremism and terrorism through dialogue, outreach and addressing the social & economic conditions that drive terrorism. It is also key to bridge the trust deficit between the government and NSAs. Ultimately, in tackling Violent Extremism, it's imperative to promote the transformation of societies and economies, and to facilitate the pursuit of just, fair and

tolerant societies in which all can live a life of opportunity and dignity. Finally, GoK and donors should fund religious organizations such as SUPKEM which are into countering the narratives of religious extremists and preventing extremist religious clerics from preaching in the mosques.

### **6.3.2 Other elements of effective CT Strategy for Kenya**

Firstly, though Kenya's diplomatic solution in the light of mediating and encouraging peace in Somalia and Sudan has achieved great results, Kenya should ensure through its role in the region that South Sudan does not relapse into a war. Similarly, Nairobi should continue its cooperation with key actors to ensure that Somalia becomes a stable country with a strong government. These will address the challenge of unstable neighbors, as one of the key factors, proliferating terror acts in Kenya. Secondly, Nairobi must have to boost its border control policing and surveillance to address the host of cross-border, refugee, and immigration issues. This will help to ensure that certain terror elements do not come into Kenya illegally and should be central to an effective anti-terrorist policy. In line with this, corruption in the security forces must be seriously dealt with.

Thirdly, there should be committed and pragmatic efforts by Nairobi to address organization inefficiency of the security forces.<sup>196</sup> Nairobi should start courting resources, enhance the technical capacity of these agencies and forces, and boost security forces coordination. There should be further efforts in increasing manpower and training the police and military on modern counter terrorism technologies and tactics. Through bilateral and multilateral cooperation, Nairobi should ensure that it gets accurate and timely information on Al-Shabaab operations to

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<sup>196</sup> Godfrey Buluma, "Al-Shabaab: The Threat To Kenya And The Horn Of Africa," United States Army War College, 2014



enable effective responses. It remains imperative for the country to maintain a high level of terrorism preparedness.

Finally, Nairobi should prioritize the inclusion of Muslims in politics, the economy, and everyday life. This includes, as has been a crucial strategy of the Global War on Terror, “winning the hearts and minds of target populations.” In this case, the target population is coastal Swahili Muslims. Islamic scholars and organizations should play a part in community life instead of being branded as sponsors of terrorism. This will enable Kenya to operate as a more secular and open-minded country where religion is not the overwhelming root of anger and dissent.

#### **6.3.4CT Multilateral Grand Strategy in the Horn of Africa**

Firstly, efforts to make Somalia stable should be prioritized by regional and international actors. In the same light, it is key that the UN, AU, and the international community should call upon all countries who are stake holders, including the Gulf States, to support the Somali government. Secondly, the regional armies’ differing interests must be addressed in order not to negatively affect the coalition’s cohesion and the ability to conduct operations. Thirdly and in Kenya, Washington should also use its position as a donor to encourage sweeping reforms with regards to culture of corruption that has proven so pervasive within the Kenyan bureaucracy.<sup>197</sup> As a result of poor pay and low professional standards, many policemen and immigration officials remain vulnerable to corruption by criminal as well as terrorist elements.<sup>198</sup> In the same light, Washington should strongly encourage Nairobi to devote adequate resources to the aim of improving pay and training for its police and immigration to decrease the chances that terrorists will be able to bribe police so as to avoid arrest

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<sup>197</sup> Robert Jones and David H Gray, "Bolstering Governance: The Need for a Multifaceted Approach to United States Counterterrorism Policy in the Horn of Africa Region," *Global Security Studies*, Fall 2013, Volume 4, Issue 4

<sup>198</sup> Rotberg, R., "Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa. Washington D.C.," *The Brookings Institution*, 2005, p. 190

and incarceration or bribe immigration personnel so as to obtain false transit documents.

Fourthly, information sharing and coordination of intelligence should be continuously prioritized among the regional partners and the coalition forces in the fight against Al-Shabaab. Regional and Somali national governments should continue to counter the organization's propaganda. The UN and U.S should continue the logistical support to and resourcing of AMISOM Forces. The UN should consider taking over the mission from the AU, in order to broaden it and give it a true international legitimacy. This will in turn increase the possibilities of building capacity for the development of effective security institutions. AMISOM Forces should undertake training and building capacity for the Somali forces in order to start conducting effective security duties based on a time line.

Fifthly, it's necessary that regional economic blocs admit Somalia to encourage regional trade and provide a market for its products to enable its economy to recoup. It is important to increase job opportunities for Somali youth, which will reduce their exploitability by Al-Shabaab.<sup>199</sup> Multilateral CT strategies in the region should be preventive by having the human security element as this will help to address broader social and political conditions favourable for the spread of terrorism. Such strategies should focus on addressing issues such as the lack of rule of law, socioeconomic marginalization, political exclusion, and lack of good governance; as well as supporting peace-building and human rights protection and enhancing dialogue.

Sixthly, by securing national borders and training border patrol personnel and the screening of refugees; this will aid to separate out the criminal element from the permissible refugees before they can be registered and find their way into Kenya

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<sup>199</sup> Godfrey Buluma, "Al-Shabaab: The Threat To Kenya And The Horn Of Africa," United States Army War College, 2014

through the refugee camps.<sup>200</sup> There should be increased partnerships between nations, regional and international actors and domestic NSAs. This will help to address violent extremism, radicalization and some other root causes of terrorism. Terrorism cannot be defeated by military force, law enforcement measures, and intelligence operations alone. Ultimately, since Al-Shabaab require a safe haven to function, it is important to aggressively police under-governed areas and disrupt the organization's support network and finances.<sup>201</sup>

#### **6.4 Suggested Areas for further studies**

Based on the findings of this study, the following areas are significant for further studies: Implication of National Interest of Coalition Forces in Somalia on Counterterrorism efforts in the Horn of Africa; Corruption, Socio-economic development and the effectiveness of Counterterrorism in Kenya; and The Viability of Joint Community, Private and Public Policing on Counterterrorism in Kenya.

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<sup>200</sup> Ibid

<sup>201</sup> Scott D. Campbell, "What is the best way forward in fighting terrorism on the Horn of Africa?," January 14, 2014. Retrieved on 21 June 2016, from <http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/best-way-forward-fighting-terrorism-horn-africa/p32211>

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## APPENDICES

### Appendix I - Letter of Introduction

Date ...../...../2016

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Dear Sir/Madam:

#### REQUEST FOR COLLECTION OF DATA

My name is **PETER V.G. GATUIKU**, a Masters' student at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, College of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Nairobi.

I am conducting a research study titled "**COUNTERING TERRORISM IN THE HORN OF AFRICA:A CASE STUDY OF KENYA**".

You have been selected to form part of this study.

Kindly assist by filling in the attached interview guide. The information given will be treated in strict confidence and will be purely used for academic purposes.

Your assistance and cooperation will be highly appreciated.

Yours Sincerely,

**Peter V.G. Gatuiku,**

**R50/74999/2014**

## Appendix II – Consent Form

**Title of the Study:** “Countering Terrorism in the Horn of Africa: A Case Study of Kenya.”

**Institution:** Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, Faculty of Arts, College of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Nairobi, P.O.BOX 30197-00400, Nairobi.

**Investigator:** Peter V.G. Gatuiku

**Supervisor:** Prof Ambassador Maria Nzomo

**Ethical Approval:** University of Nairobi Ethical and Research Committee; and National Council for Science and Technology.

Permission is requested from you to participate in this research study. With principles that your agreement to participate in this study is voluntary.

May wish to withdraw from the study at any point you deem fit.

May seek clarity to understand the nature and importance of this study

**Purpose of the study:** To find out the causes/drivers of Terrorism, and evaluate the effectiveness of Countering Terrorism mechanisms in Kenya.

**Procedures to be followed:** With your cooperation, you will answer questions related to the objectives of this study. All information obtained will be handled with confidentiality.

**Risks:** There will be no risks involved in this study to you.

**Benefits:** There may be no direct benefits to you but the results of this study will be useful in investigating the performance of existing CT strategies and propose a more comprehensive approach that includes all stakeholders, in the Horn of Africa and Kenya.

**Assurance on confidentiality:** All information obtained from you will be kept confidential and used for the purpose of this study only.

**Contacts:** you may wish to contact me with regards to issues concerning this study through any of the various addresses provided above.

I now request you to sign the consent form attached

## CONSENT FORM

“Countering Terrorism in the Horn of Africa: A Case Study of Kenya.”

I \_\_\_\_\_ (respondent) give consent to the investigator to use the information that I will provide him as part of his study and that the nature of the study has been \_\_\_\_\_ explained \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_ me \_\_\_\_\_ by \_\_\_\_\_ the  
.....

Signature \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

I (field agent/researcher) confirm that I have explained the nature and effect of the study.

Signature \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

## Appendix III – Structured Interview Guide for the Personnel of Key Government Agencies

Date \_\_\_\_\_/2016

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### QUESTIONS:

Tick and Fill as appropriate

#### SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHICS

1. Gender Male [ ] Female [ ]
2. What is your age? \_\_\_\_\_Years
3. Name of organisation? \_\_\_\_\_
4. What is your area of specialisation? \_\_\_\_\_
5. What is your period of experience in the organisation? \_\_\_\_\_Years
6. Highest Level of education? \_\_\_\_\_

#### SECTION B: CAUSES/DRIVERS OF TERRORISM IN KENYA

- 1). What do you think are the drivers of terrorism?

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- 2). Tick your opinion on the following:

- a). Poor socio-economic conditions such as *low income, unemployment, illiteracy and marginalization* influence Terrorism? [Yes] or [No]
- b) Bad governance influences Terrorism? [Yes] or [No]
- c). Religious fundamentalism influences Terrorism? [Yes] or [No]
- d). External factors such as *joint war against terror, foreign military deployment and the influence of terrorist organizations abroad* influence Terrorism? [Yes] or [No]

- 3). Do you have the opinion that Counter Terrorism operations of the Government of Kenya (GoK) do not deal with the some of the causes of Terrorism in question no 2?

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## SECTION C: COUNTERING TERRORISM MECHANISMS IN KENYA

1). What are the GoK's mechanisms on Countering Terrorism?

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2). In the GoK's current fight against Terrorism, are there mechanisms to involve:

a). NGOs? [YES] or [NO]

Explain:

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b). Communities? [YES] or [NO]

Explain:

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3). Do these mechanisms address these drivers/causes of Terrorism in Question No 2 of SECTION

B?:

a). Socio-Economic? [Yes] or [No]

Explain your reason:

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b). Bad governance? [Yes] or [No]

Explain your reason:

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c). Religious fundamentalism? [Yes] or [No]

Explain your reason:

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d). External factors? [Yes] or [No]

Explain your reason:

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4). Counter Terrorism mechanisms of the GOK:

a). Are they more of military? [Yes] or [No]

b). Do they have less consideration of human rights? [Yes] or [No]

c). Do they have elements of democratic governance? [Yes] or [No]

#### **SECTION D: EVALUATING THE COUNTERING TERRORISM MECHANISMS IN KENYA**

1). How effective have these Counter Terrorism mechanisms been?

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2). What do you consider to be the challenges of GoK's Counter Terrorism mechanisms?

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3). Do you think that addressing the aforementioned drivers of terrorism will help in ameliorating it?

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4). Do you think that the inclusion of NGOs, religious communities, affected communities, families of victims, private sector, media and rehabilitated victims, in the GoK's CT strategies will help to combat terrorism?

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5). What are your suggestions on how Terrorism could be countered in the best of ways, in Kenya, while considering the drivers mentioned in Question No 2 of Section B?

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## Appendix IV – Structured Interview Guide for Civil Society Personnel

Date \_\_\_\_\_/2016

### QUESTIONS:

Tick and Fill as appropriate

#### SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHICS

1. Gender Male [ ] Female [ ]
2. What is your age? \_\_\_\_\_Years
3. Name of organization? \_\_\_\_\_
4. What is your area of specialization? \_\_\_\_\_
5. What is your period of experience in the organization? \_\_\_\_\_Years
6. Highest Level of education? \_\_\_\_\_

#### SECTION B: CAUSES/DRIVERS OF TERRORISM IN KENYA

- 1). What do you think are the drivers of terrorism?

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- 2). Tick your opinion on the following:

- a). Poor socio-economic conditions such as *low income, unemployment, illiteracy and marginalization* influence Terrorism? [Yes] or [No]
- b). Bad governance influences Terrorism? [Yes] or [No]
- c). Religious fundamentalism influences Terrorism? [Yes] or [No]
- d). External factors such as *joint war against terror, foreign military deployment and the influence of terrorist organizations abroad* influence Terrorism? [Yes] or [No]

- 3). Do you have the opinion that Counter Terrorism operations of the Government of Kenya (GoK) do not deal with the some of the causes of Terrorism in question no 2?

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### SECTION C: GoK's COUNTER-TERRORISM MECHANISMS

1). How do you perceive the government's war on Terrorism?

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2). What are some of the GoK's mechanisms on Countering Terrorism?

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3). Counter Terrorism mechanisms of the GOK:

a). Are they more of military? [Yes] or [No]

b). Do they have less consideration of human rights? [Yes] or [No]

c). Do they have elements of democratic governance? [Yes] or [No]

4). Do you think that GoK's CT mechanisms have been effective?

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5). In the GoK's current fight against Terrorism, are there mechanisms to involve:

a). NGOs? [YES] or [NO]

Explain:

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b). Communities? [YES] or [NO]

Explain:

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6). Do these mechanisms address these drivers/causes of Terrorism in Question No 2 of SECTION

B?:

a). Socio-Economic? [Yes] or [No]

Explain your reason:

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b). Bad governance? [Yes] or [No]

Explain your reason:

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c). Religious fundamentalism? [Yes] or [No]

Explain your reason:

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d). External factors? [Yes] or [No]

Explain your reason:

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7). How do you think that the government could fight Terrorism and observe human rights at the same time?

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#### **SECTION D: OTHER COUNTER-TERRORISM MECHANISMS IN KENYA**

1). What is your organization doing to counter the already existing narratives advanced by extremists?

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2). Is there anything you are doing to improve the relationship between the Muslim community and security community?

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3). What programs do you have to counter violent extremism or radicalization?

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i). How effective have they been?

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ii). Were either of them executed in partnership with the government?

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iii). Were either of them development oriented, in terms of dealing with some of the socio-economic root causes of terrorism mentioned above?

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iv). What challenges did some of these programs face or your organization is facing in subsequent intended ones?

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4). Do you think that addressing the aforementioned drivers of terrorism will help in ameliorating it?

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5). Do you think that the inclusion of NGOs, religious communities, affected communities, families of victims, private sector, media and rehabilitated victims, in the GoK's CT strategies will help to combat terrorism?

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6). What are your suggestions on how Terrorism could be countered in the best of ways, in Kenya, while considering the drivers mentioned in Question No 2 of Section B?

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